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COMMENT
PATENTLY WRONG: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
OF FLORIDA PREPAJD POSTSECONDARY
EDUCATION EXPENSE BOARD v. COLLEGE
SAVINGS BANK
DANIEL J. M.ELMAN*
"Constitutions are intended to preserve practical and
substantial rights, not to maintain theories."'
-OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR.
INTRODUCTION
Public policy and fairness mandate that the states should
not be immune from federal court suits arising under the patent
laws. Whether the federal Constitution authorizes Congress to
abrogate state immunity in patent actions, however, is a more
complex issue.
In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board
v. College Savings Bank2 the United States Supreme Court
invalidated the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy
Clarification Act, which purported to make the states amenable
to patent infringement suits in federal courts, and in doing so,
held that the State of Florida could not be sued for infringement
of a New Jersey bank's patent. In this Comment, the Supreme
Court's Florida Prepaid decision will be subject to critical
" J.D. Candidate, June 2001, St. John's University School of Law; B.S.,
Polytechnic University.
1 Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 457 (1904).
2 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
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analysis. The breadth of the Supreme Court's state sovereign
immunity doctrine3 undermines the objectives of the United
States patent laws because it diminishes patent owners'
exclusive rights to their inventions.
In order to understand the inconsistency between the patent
laws and the doctrine of state sovereign immunity, it is
necessary to briefly examine the fundamental principles of
patent law, as well as the Supreme Court's Eleventh
Amendment-state sovereign immunity jurisprudence.
I. PATENT LAW
Patent law protects new, unobvious, and useful inventions
such as machines, devices, chemical compositions, and
manufacturing processes.4 The grant of a patent confers upon
the patentee the right to exclude others from making, using, or
selling in the United States, the product or process covered by
the patent.5 A patentee's exclusive rights last for twenty years
from the date on which the patent application was filed.6
Significant public policy issues underlie patent law. It is
clear that humans rarely produce significant mental creations
without great time, effort, and expense. Patent law, by granting
exclusive market rights, provides the incentive for people to
undertake and produce significant inventions. The Supreme
Court has declared that the objectives of the federal patent laws
are to (1) seek the stimulation of further innovation; (2) promote
the disclosure of inventions to stimulate further innovation and
to permit the public to practice the invention once the patent
expires; and (3) impose stringent requirements for patentability
to assure that ideas in the public domain remain there for the
3 Sovereign immunity is
[a] judicial doctrine which precludes bringing suit against the government
without its consent. Founded on the ancient principle that "the King can do
no wrong," it bars holding the government or its political subdivisions
liable for the torts of its officers or agents unless such immunity is
expressly waived by statute or by necessary inference from legislative
enactment.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1396 (6th ed. 1990).
4 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994); see also Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185
F.3d 1364, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
5 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (1994); see also Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v.
Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637, 643 (1947).
6 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (1994).
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free use of the public. 7  Another important policy issue
underlying patent law is a general aversion to monopolies over
inventions and a preference for competition.8 The Constitution
embodies these opposing policy issues.9 By allowing Congress to
secure exclusive rights to an invention, the Constitution induces
the undertaking of mental creations. By requiring that these
exclusive rights be granted for "limited times,"10 however, the
Constitution strikes a balance between incentive and
competition, as well as between property and monopoly.
Under the patent laws, a patent application must fully
describe the invention." The specifications and drawings filed
with a patent application are printed and distributed as part of
the issued patent.12 Therefore, one of the primary objectives of
the patent system is that inventions be fully disclosed for the
benefit of the public.13 At the expiration of the patentee's
"limited" period of exclusivity, the public is free to utilize and
improve upon the invention in any way it wishes.14 Thus, the
7 See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979).
8 See C.H. Boehringer Sohn v. Watson, 256 F.2d 713, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1958)
(stating that "the inhospitable attitude toward patents [stems] in part from our
natural aversion to monopolies"); Mastantuono v. Ronconi, 278 F. Supp. 144, 146
(S.D.N.Y. 1967) (noting the general reluctance to grant private monopolies in goods
and business, but that Congress has nonetheless seen fit to enact patent laws that
allow an inventor a limited private monopoly over an invention).
9 The Constitution provides that Congress shall have the power "[rio promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This clause is commonly referred to as the Patent
Clause or the Copyright Clause.
10 Id.
11 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.71 (1999); see also DONALD S. CHISUM & MICHAEL A.
JACOBS, UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 2D[1] (1997).
12 See CHISUM & JACOBS, supra note 11, § 2D[1].
13 See 35 U.S.C § 112 (1994) (requiring a patentee to describe the invention in
terms sufficient to enable others skilled in the relevant art to practice the
invention).
14 See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY'S DESK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 237 (1991). McCarthy states that
[i]n return for receiving the right to exclude, which is the gist of a patent,
the inventor must give up secrecy and fully disclose the details of the
invention to the public. This will enable others to understand the invention
and be able to use it as a stepping stone to further develop the technology.
Id.; see also MICHAEL A. EPSTEIN, EPSTEIN ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 5-4 to 5-5
& n.8 (4th ed. 1999) (noting that while a patentee is guaranteed twenty years in
which he alone may make and sell the invention, the exclusivity of a patent is not
total, for during this time a patentee must allow others to improve on the
technology).
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patent system achieves Congress's mandate of promoting the
progress of the useful arts.
The federal district courts have exclusive subject matter
jurisdiction over patent disputes.' 5  Federal courts are
authorized to enjoin unauthorized activity16 or award "damages
adequate to compensate for the infringement."17 Furthermore, a
court has the authority to "increase the damages up to three
times the amount found or assessed."18 Lastly, in "exceptional
cases," a court may award attorney fees to the prevailing party.19
II. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
The Eleventh Amendment was passed in response to the
Supreme Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia.20  In
Chisholm, the Court held that states were subject to the
15 See 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1994). For purposes of this Comment, it is sufficient to
state that infringement arises when a party manufactures, uses, or sells the
patented invention without authorization. An unauthorized invasion of a patentee's
exclusive rights constitutes infringement even if committed without knowledge of
the patent. See Thurber Corp. v. Fairchild Motor Corp., 269 F.2d 841, 845, 849 (5th
Cir. 1959). Knowledge and intent, however, may be relevant for a determination of
the measure of damages. See, e.g., Central Soya Co. v. Geo A. Hormel & Co., 723
F.2d 1573, 1576-77 (Fed Cir. 1983). In addition to patent infringement suits,
"actions, known as declaratory judgment actions, frequently are initiated by entities
that have embarked, or plan to embark in the near future, on a course of conduct
that may implicate the patent rights of another." Elizabeth Stotland Weiswasser &
Beth A. Oliak, Determining Rights Through Declaratory Judgments, NAT'L L.J.,
July 24, 2000, at C8. For example, a company selling or making a particular product
may be concerned that the product is encompassed by a patent. The company may
initiate a declaratory judgment proceeding seeking a declaration that its product
does not infringe on the patent, or that the patent is invalid or unenforceable. See
id. The requirements for initiating a declaratory judgment action are delineated in
the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1994).
16 See 35 U.S.C. § 283 (1994).
17 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994). Money damages typically include lost profits and lost
royalties. See Fonar Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 107 F.3d 1543, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(affirming a jury verdict awarding plaintiffs lost profits and reasonable royalty
damages).
18 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1994).
19 Id. § 285. Attorney fees are generally awarded only when willful
infringement or bad faith litigation has occurred. See Beckman Instruments, Inc. v.
LEB Produkter AB, 892 F.2d 1547, 1551-52 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding that the
district court did not commit clear error in finding the case "exceptional" because of
the infringer's "strategy of vexatious activity."); Avia Group Intl, Inc. v. L.A. Gear
Cal., Inc., 853 F.2d 1557, 1567 (Fed Cir. 1988) (stating that the willfulness of the
infringement may be a sufficient basis for finding the case "exceptional" for
purposes of awarding attorney fees).
20 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
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Supreme Court's original jurisdiction over suits between a state
and citizens of another state.21 The states responded to the
Court's shocking22  decision by ratifying the Eleventh
Amendment in 1798.23 The Eleventh Amendment has been
interpreted in numerous Supreme Court decisions over the last
century.24 Early cases initially expanded the reach of the
amendment,25 and more recent cases have restricted the states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity to federal legislation.26 The
Supreme Court, however, has often failed to reach a consensus
21 See id. at 420. In Chisholm, a South Carolina citizen successfully brought
suit against the State of Georgia on behalf of a deceased South Carolina citizen's
estate. Id.
22 See Akbil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425,
1432 (1987) (discussing the colonists' notions of sovereign immunity evolving from
British law). During the ratification period, Alexander Hamilton wrote, "It is
inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual
without its consent." THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 529 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Bicentennial ed., 1976). It should be noted, however, that nowhere in the text of the
U.S. Constitution does the principle of state sovereign immunity appear.
23 The Eleventh Amendment provides that "[tihe Judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
24 See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that the
Eleventh Amendment prevents Congress from authorizing suits by Indian tribes
against states to enforce legislation under the Indian Commerce Clause);
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989) (holding that Congress has
authority under Article I to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity);
Delimuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989) (holding that the Education of the
Handicapped Act does not abrogate the states' immunity from suit); Atascadero
State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985) (holding that an action under the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 is barred by the Eleventh Amendment); Parden v.
Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964) (holding that a state operating a common carrier
railroad in interstate commerce constituted waiver of sovereign immunity); Petty v.
Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959) (holding that a state
waived immunity by entering into a compact which authorizes the state to "sue or
be sued"); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (holding that a state cannot be sued
by one of its citizens without the state's consent).
25 See Hans, 134 U.S. at 1. In Hans, a citizen of Louisiana sued the State of
Louisiana in federal court for violating the Contracts Clause of the Constitution. See
id. at 3. Basing its decision on notions of state sovereign immunity, the Court stated
that, despite the absence of textual support in the Eleventh Amendment, the State
of Louisiana was immune from suits in federal court by its own citizens. See id. at
10-13. In support of its decision, the Court cited The Federalist 81 and the Virginia
Convention, arguing that Framers like Alexander Hamilton and John Marshall
believed that states were sovereign entities and therefore not subject to suits
brought by individuals. See id. at 12-15.
26 Throughout this Comment, "sovereign immunity," "state immunity," and
"Eleventh Amendment immunity" are used interchangeably.
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on its interpretation of the amendment.27 Some justices have
advocated a literal reading of the Eleventh Amendment,28 while
other justices have supported the more expansive interpretation
set forth in Hans v. Louisiana.29
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has identified three
instances in which the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a
federal suit against a state: prospective injunctive relief,
constructive waiver, and abrogation of states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity.30
In Ex parte Young,31 the Supreme Court held that the
Eleventh Amendment does not bar actions for prospective
injunctive relief brought by individuals against a state official
who violates federal law while acting within the scope of that
official's duties.32  The Court reasoned that a state official
27 See, e.g., Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 224 (5-4 decision); Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. at
3-4 (plurality opinion), overruled by Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 46 (5-4 decision)
(taking an expansive approach to the Eleventh Amendment); Atascadero, 473 U.S.
at 235 (5-4 decision); Parden, 377 U.S. at 198 (5-4 decision), overruled in part by
Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 470 (1987)
(plurality opinion); Petty, 359 U.S. at 283 (5-3 decision); see also Kenneth S.
Weitzman, Comment, Copyright and Patent Clause of the Constitution: Does
Congress Have the Authority to Abrogate State Eleventh Amendment Sovereign
Immunity After Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.?, 2 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 297,
303 (1991) (noting that substantial confusion has been caused by the inconsistencies
in U.S. Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Eleventh Amendment).
28 See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 259 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (claiming that the
constitutional principle of sovereign immunity does not exist); Union Gas Co., 491
U.S. at 23 (Stevens, J., concurring) (supporting a more literal interpretation of the
Eleventh Amendment).
29 134 U.S. 1 (1890); Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. at 30 (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (rejecting an invitation to overrule Hans). Justice
Scalia's position is especially ironic in light of his insistence on adhering to the
canon of plain meaning interpretation and the exceptional clarity of the Eleventh
Amendment. See, e.g., Marx v. Texas, 528 U.S. 1034, 1035 (1999) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("I do not think the Court should ever depart from the plain meaning of
the Bill of Rights."); Dunn v. CFTC, 519 U.S. 465, 480 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part) (agreeing with the Court that the purposes of the Treasury Amendment are
best fulfilled by adhering to the plain meaning of the language).
30 See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1987) (holding that, for the purpose of
enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress may provide for private suits
against states or state officials); Parden, 377 U.S. at 192 (holding that Congress has
the authority to condition states' participation in federally-regulated activities upon
the states' constructive waiver of their immunity); Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar actions for injunctive
relief brought against state officials).
31 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
32 See id. at 159-60. In Young, a suit was brought by stockholders in a railroad
company seeking to enjoin a state attorney general from enforcing a state act. See
PATENTLY WRONG
attempting to enforce an unconstitutional legislative enactment
on behalf of the state was acting outside of his representative
duties and accordingly, was personally liable for his actions.33
Undoubtedly, the Court realized that without this exception to
the Eleventh Amendment, there would be no remedy for
Fourteenth Amendment violations. The Eleventh Amendment
continued, however, to prohibit suits for monetary damages paid
out of state funds, regardless of whether a state official was
named as a nominal defendant.34 Notably, in Young, the Court
began to restrict its expansive interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment articulated in Hans.
Although the Supreme Court consistently recognized that a
state may waive its immunity by consenting to suit in federal
court,35 in Parden v. Terminal Railway of Alabama State Docks
Department,35 the Court laid the foundation by stating that
certain provisions of the Constitution grant Congress the
authority to condition the states' participation in federally-
regulated activities upon the states' constructive waiver of their
immunity.37 The Court reasoned that "the States surrendered a
portion of their sovereignty when they granted Congress the
power to regulate commerce."38 As a result, "when a state leaves
the sphere that is exclusively its own and enters into activities
subject to congressional regulation, it subjects itself to that
regulation as fully as if it were a private person or corporation."39
In subsequent decisions, however, the Court retreated from the
id. at 131. The attorney general was trying to impose rates through enforcement of
a state act in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id.
33 See id. at 159-60.
34 See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Department of the Treasury of Ind., 323 U.S. 459,
463 (1945) (concluding that a suit for monetary damages paid out of a state treasury
was an impermissible suit against a state).
35 See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985)
(announcing that a state may validly waive its immunity upon consenting to suit).
36 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
37 See id. at 192. In Parden, the Court held that the State of Alabama, by virtue
of its operation and ownership of a railroad, had implicitly consented to suit in
federal court in an action arising under the Federal Employers' Liability Act
(FELA), passed by Congress pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers. See id. at
194-98.
38 Id. at 191.
39 Id. at 196. Since FELA did not expressly exempt the states from its scope,
the Court reasoned that the State of Alabama became subject to the statute when it
assumed the function of a common carrier. See id. at 187-90. The Court concluded
that to find otherwise would result in the creation of a "right without a remedy." Id.
at 190.
2000]
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broad Parden conception of constructive waiver. The Court first
limited the Parden doctrine to cases in which the state engaged
in non-traditional governmental business, such as the operation
of the for-profit railroad in Parden.40 Finally, in Welch v. Texas
Department of Highways & Public Transportation,41 the Court
overruled Parden to the extent that it was "inconsistent with the
requirement that an abrogation of Eleventh Amendment
immunity . . . must be expressed in unmistakably clear
language."42
Although Parden was based on implied or constructive
waiver, Parden laid the foundation for Congress's power to
abrogate the states' immunity. 43 In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,4 the
Court held that "Congress may, in determining what is
'appropriate legislation' for the purpose of enforcing the
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private
suits against states or state officials which are constitutionally
impermissible in other contexts."45 The Court held that states
may be made amenable to suits in federal court pursuant to
Congress's Enforcement Clause powers to enact and enforce the
Civil Rights Act and the other substantive guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 46  The Court reasoned that the
40 See Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub.
Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 284-85 (1973) (holding that the states retain their
immunity when engaging in traditional government functions).
41 483 U.S. 468 (1987).
42 Id. at 478. In Welch, a state employee brought an action under the Jones Act
for injuries she sustained while working on a ferry dock belonging to the Texas
Highway Department. See id. at 471. Under the Jones Act, an employee who
suffered physical injuries in the course of employment was permitted to bring a suit
for damages against the employer in federal court. See id. at 471 n.1.
43 The distinction, or lack thereof, between abrogation and constructive waiver
is beyond the scope of this Comment. For a discussion of the theories of abrogation
and constructive waiver, see Kit Kinports, Implied Waiver After Seminole Tribe, 82
MINN. L. REV. 793, 798-807 (1998).
44 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
45 Id. at 456. In 1972, Congress amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to
authorize federal courts to award money damages to private individuals suing a
state for discrimination based on race, sex, color, religion, or national origin. See id.
at 447-48. In Fitzpatrick, male state employees sought payments of retirement
benefits from the state under Title VII, alleging that the state retirement plan
discriminated against them based on gender. See id. at 448.
46 See id. at 456. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o State shall...
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Enforcement Clause provides that "Congress shall
have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."
Id. § 5.
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Fourteenth Amendment altered the federal-state balance of
power envisioned in the passage of the Eleventh Amendment.4 7
Following Fitzpatrick, the Supreme Court narrowed its
interpretation of Congress's authority to abrogate immunity in
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon.48 Although the Court in
Atascadero reaffirmed that Congress may abrogate state
immunity from suits in federal court, it added that Congress
must announce specifically and unequivocally, in the statute's
text, its intent to confer federal jurisdiction over the states.49
According to the Supreme Court, requiring an unequivocal
expression of congressional intent to abrogate Eleventh
Amendment immunity served to preserve the delicate balance
between the federal government and the states struck by the
Constitution. 0 In his dissent, Justice Brennan argued that the
Court's holding served to protect states that violate federal law,
rather than to protect the federal system.51 Since Atascadero,
the United States Supreme Court has looked only to the
language of a statute, ignoring evidence of intent from the
legislative history when deciding if the requisite congressional
47 See Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 455. Recently, in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507 (1997), the Supreme Court restricted Congress's power to enforce the
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to remedial or preventive measures. The
Court held that, in enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress may not make
substantive changes in law. See id. at 519; see also infra notes 70-79 and
accompanying text (discussing the City of Boerne decision).
48 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
49 See id. at 243. In Atascadero, the respondent filed a federal suit against the
state alleging discrimination in violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973. See id. at 236. The Court concluded that section 505, which provided remedies
for violations of section 504 by "any recipient of Federal assistance," constituted a
general waiver and therefore, not sufficient to abrogate Eleventh Amendment
immunity. See id. at 245-46.
50 See id. at 242-43.
51 See id. at 252-53 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan's dissent is justified to
the extent that the respondent, who was disabled, was left without a remedy
against a state that violated federal law. Moreover, Justice Brennan was correct in
stating that by requiring unmistakably clear language in the statute, the Court
changed the rules for lawmaking after Congress had already acted. See id. at 253-
54. Justice Brennan is likewise justified in stating that Congress "cannot be
expected to predict the future course of constitutional law." Id. at 255 n.7 (internal
citation omitted). Courts, however, should not be precluded from redefining
constitutional law and setting limits on the ability of Congress to legislate simply
because Congress had acted, even if a court's ruling has the retroactive effect of
invalidating legislation. To hold otherwise would strip the judiciary of its
established role in the constitutional scheme of checks and balances.
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intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity has been satisfied.5 2
Thirteen years after the Court's decision in Fitzpatrick, the
Court in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.5 3 held that, in addition
to its authority under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Congress had the authority under the Commerce Clause 4 to
abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity.55  The
Supreme Court concluded that the amended language of the
environmental statute clearly manifested Congress's intent to
hold states liable for the costs of cleaning up hazardous waste.5 6
Furthermore, the Court held that Congress's authority to
regulate commerce includes the authority to abrogate Eleventh
Amendment immunity when Congress deems necessary.57
Justice Brennan, writing the Court's decision, observed that the
states relinquished a portion of their sovereign immunity by
ratifying the Constitution and granting Congress plenary
authority to regulate commerce. 58 Dissenting in part, Justice
Scalia argued that Eleventh Amendment immunity was vital to
52 See, e.g., Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230 (1989) (stating that legislative
history is generally irrelevant in deciding whether Congress intended to abrogate
state immunity). The Constitution strives to maintain a delicate balance between
federal and state government, and courts should likewise strive to maintain that
balance. The Eleventh Amendment is clearly designed to shift the balance towards
the states-exactly how much of a shift is precisely the issue that has plagued the
Court for over 100 years. Because Congress may not treat the states as "mere
prefectures or corporations," but rather as "joint participants in a federal system,"
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 758 (1999), requiring Congress to use unmistakably
clear language in abrogating state immunity is justified. Such clear statutory
language will dispense with the need to rely on legislative history and clearly signal
that Congress intends to abrogate state sovereign immunity and shift the
constitutional balance.
53 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
54 The Commerce Clause provides: "The Congress shall have Power... To
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
s5 See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 23 (1989). In Union Gas Co.,
the State of Pennsylvania claimed Eleventh Amendment immunity from liability
imposed on site "owners and operators" by the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) and the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA). See id. at 13-14.
56 See id. at 13. CERCLA excludes a state from liability if it acquired title
involuntarily. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D) (1994). Section 9601(20)(D) also provides
that "[t]he exclusion.., shall not apply to any State... which has caused or
contributed to the release.., of a hazardous substance... and such a State...
shall be subject to the provisions of this chapter in the same manner and to the same
extent... as any non-governmental entity...." Id. (emphasis added).
57 See Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. at 19-20.
58 See id. at 20.
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the concept of federalism, and therefore, Congress should not be
able to abrogate immunity under its Article I powers. 59
In the landmark case of Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida,60 the Supreme Court amplified the doctrine of sovereign
immunity by narrowly overruling Union Gas Co. in a five to four
decision.61 The Court declared that Congress could not abrogate
state sovereign immunity by using its Commerce Clause
authority to legislate.62  It stated that "[t]he Eleventh
Amendment restricts the judicial power under Article III, and
Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional
limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction."63  The Court
proclaimed that its decision in Fitzpatrick, which permitted
abrogation under the Fourteenth Amendment, could not support
abrogating state immunity under Article I provisions that
predated the ratification of the Eleventh Amendment.64
Strikingly, it stated that [elven when the Constitution vests in
Congress complete lawmaking authority over a particular area,
the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional authorization
of suits by private parties against unconsenting States."65 While
denying Congress's authority to abrogate state immunity under
Article I, the Court reaffirmed that Congress's authority to
abrogate state immunity via the Fourteenth Amendment
remained undisputed.66 The dissent, written by Justice Stevens,
59 See id. at 38 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
60 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
61 See id. at 66. The four Justices who dissented in Union Gas Co., along with
Justice Thomas, formed the majority in Seminole Tribe. The only Justice from the
Union Gas Co. plurality remaining on the Court was Justice Stevens.
62 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 47. In Seminole Tribe, the plaintiff, the
Seminole Tribe of Florida, filed a suit against the State of Florida to compel certain
good faith negotiations between the state and the tribe under the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2701-21 (1994). Under the Act, if a state did not act in
good faith, the tribe had the right to sue the state in a federal district court. See id.
§ 2710(d)(7)(A). Congress enacted the Gaming Regulatory Act under its Article I
powers to regulate commerce with Indian tribes. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 47.
63 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72-73.
64 See id. at 65-66.
65 Id. at 72.
66 See id. at 59. The Court reaffirmed the concept announced in Fitzpatrick that
the Fourteenth Amendment worked a fundamental change in the balance of federal
and state power. See id. The Court concluded, therefore, that the Fourteenth
Amendment partially repealed the Eleventh Amendment, granting Congress the
authority to override the limits established by the Eleventh Amendment to the
extent appropriate to make the rights created by the Fourteenth Amendment fully
effective. See id. at 65-66.
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presciently argued that denying Congress the power to abrogate
sovereign immunity under Article I would threaten portions of
several other federal statutes such as bankruptcy, copyright, and
antitrust laws, which purport to render states amenable to suit
in federal court.67
Following Seminole Tribe, determining whether Congress
has validly abrogated the states' immunity from suit in federal
court requires a two-step inquiry. The first step is "whether
Congress has unequivocally expresse[d] its intent to abrogate the
immunity; and second, whether Congress has acted pursuant to
a valid exercise of power."68 By overruling Union Gas Co., the
Supreme Court announced that Congress may abrogate the
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity only when deemed
appropriate to enforce the substantive provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
In City of Boerne v. Flores69 the Supreme Court reformulated
the test for whether a law may be upheld as appropriate
legislation pursuant to congressional authority to enforce the
substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. At issue
in City of Boerne was the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
1993 (RFRA).70 Congress passed the RFRA in direct response to
the Court's holding in Employment Division Department of
Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,71 which construed the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to hold that
"neutral, generally applicable laws may be applied to religious
practices even when not supported by a compelling governmental
interest."7 2 Through the RFRA, Congress purported to reinstate
the compelling governmental interest test rejected in Smith by
requiring that a generally applicable law that places substantial
burdens on the free exercise of religion must be justified by a
compelling governmental interest. 73 The Court held that the
RFRA could not be justified as "appropriate" enforcement
legislation, emphasizing that Congress's enforcement power is
remedial in nature.7 4 The Court stated that "Congress does not
67 See id. at 77 & n.1.
68 Id. at 55 (alteration in original) (internal citation and quotations omitted).
69 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
70 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (1994).
71 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
72 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 514.
73 See id. at 515-16 (citing RFRA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb).
74 See id. at 519. Earlier in its decision, the Court explained that "[1legislation
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enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is[:] It
has been given the power 'to enforce,' not the power to determine
what constitutes a constitutional violation."75 The Court warned
that "[there must be a congruence and proportionality between
the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to
that end. Lacking such a connection, legislation may become
substantive in operation and effect."76 Therefore, in order to
invoke section five, Congress must identify conduct violating the
Fourteenth Amendment's substantive provisions and must tailor
the legislation to remedy or prevent such conduct.77 Analyzing
the statute, the Court noted that the RFRA failed to meet this
requirement because there was little support in the legislative
record for the concerns that prompted the legislation.
78
In 1992, Congress enacted the Patent and Plant Variety
Protection Remedy Clarification Act (PRCA) intending to
abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity to patent
infringement suits in federal courts. Prior to the passage of the
PRCA, the patent laws stated that "whoever without authority
makes, uses or sells any patented invention.., infringes the
patent."79 Initially, courts did not allow states to use sovereign
immunity as a defense to patent infringement actions.80 Several
which deters or remedies constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of
Congress'[s] enforcement power." Id. at 518.
75 Id. at 519. Undoubtedly, the Court felt that to allow Congress to determine
what constitutes a constitutional violation, would erode the Court's unquestioned
role as the sole interpreter of the Constitution. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137
(1803) (defining judicial review).
76 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
77 See id.
78 The Court compared the RFRA to the Voting Rights Act and noted that, in
contrast to the record confronting Congress and the judiciary in the voting rights
cases, RFRA's legislative record failed to cite "modern instances of generally
applicable laws passed because of religious bigotry." Id. at 530. The Court noted
that legislative hearings held prior to the enactment of the RFRA mentioned no
episodes of religious persecution in this country in the past 40 years. See id. The
Court added that Congress's concern was with incidental burdens placed on
religion, not an animus towards burdened religious practices or a widespread
pattern of religious discrimination that was the object of the legislation. See id. at
530-31.
79 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1982) (emphasis added).
80 See, e.g., Lemelson v. Ampex Corp., 372 F. Supp. 708, 711-12 (N.D. Ill. 1974)
(holding that an agency of the State of Illinois that purchased an allegedly
infringing magnetic storage device was amenable to suit for monetary damages);
Hercules Inc. v. Minnesota Highway Dep't, 337 F. Supp. 795, 799 (D. Minn. 1972)
(holding that a state department, which infringed a patent, was subject to a suit for
injunctive relief but not for monetary damages).
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rationales supported these court decisions. First, courts
reasoned that because the states granted Congress, in the Patent
Clause, the exclusive right to grant patents, the states waived
their sovereign immunity from patent lawsuits in federal court.81
Second, courts rationalized that states could not invoke their
Eleventh Amendment immunity when they violated patent
rights because such a violation constituted illegitimate state
action.82 Third, courts acknowledged that public policy dictated
that a patent owner should be able to protect a patent against an
infringing state.83 Lastly, the courts reasoned that patents were
a form of property and therefore, states should not be allowed to
take such property without compensating the patent owner.84
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Atascadero,
requiring unmistakably clear language in a statute evincing
Congress's intent to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity,
the courts were forced to hold that the states were immune from
patent suits.85 In the landmark case of Chew v. California,86 the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, upon analyzing the
United States patent code, concluded that Congress did not
intend to abrogate state immunity from the patent laws.8 7 The
81 See, e.g., Lemelson, 372 F. Supp. at 711. The court also noted that the patent
laws do not expressly exclude the states from their operation. See id.
82 See id. at 711-12; see also Hercules, 337 F. Supp. at 799 (stating that, based
on the Ex parte Young doctrine, state officials are not immune when their actions
violate the Constitution).
83 See Lemelson, 372 F. Supp. at 713. The Court relied on the Parden doctrine
to support its public policy argument.
8 See id. (stating that a state must be treated equally for violating a patent
holder's rights and therefore, holding that the state was liable for money damages
because it took property without compensation). But see Hercules, 337 F. Supp. at
798-99 (proclaiming that the state was subject to an Ex parte Young injunction for
violating a patent holder's rights, but that the Eleventh Amendment barred a suit
for damages).
85 See, e.g., Jacobs Wind Elec. Co. v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 919 F.2d 726,
727-28 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding that the state was immune from an infringement
suit seeking declaratory relief, but that the plaintiff could submit a claims bill to the
state legislature or initiate a judicial "takings" claim against the state pursuant to
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments); Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Alza Corp., 804 F.
Supp. 614, 625-26 (D.N.J. 1992) (deciding that a state university was immune to a
counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment that a patent licensed by the
university was invalid); Kersavage v. University of Tenn., 731 F. Supp. 1327, 1330
(E.D. Tenn. 1989) (holding a state university immune from paying monetary
damages for patent infringement).
86 893 F.2d 331 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
87 See id. at 334. In Chew, the plaintiff, a resident of Ohio, sued the State of
California for monetary damages alleging infringement of his patent relating to a
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court examined 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) and held that the term
"whoever" did not comply with the Supreme Court's Atascadero
standard requiring "unmistakably clear" statutory language.88
The Federal Circuit further observed that the legislative history
of the Patent Act was not sufficient to overcome the equivocal
statutory language, regardless of the fact that patent
infringement claims are under exclusive federal jurisdiction.89
After the Federal Circuit's decision in Chew90 and other
cases dismissing patent actions against states under claims of
Eleventh Amendment immunity,91 Congress realized that a
dangerous loophole existed in the patent laws.92 Since the
federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over suits arising
under the patent laws and the Federal Circuit had held that the
states and their instrumentalities were immune from patent
infringement suits in the federal courts, the states had virtually
absolute immunity and could infringe patent rights without
liability. Using the "unmistakably clear" standard established in
Atascadero, Congress enacted the PRCA amendments to the
patent laws to explicitly establish that states are subject to
patent infringement suits in federal court.93 The new legislation
test that measured automobile exhaust emissions. See id. at 332. California moved
to dismiss the suit under its Eleventh Amendment immunity. See id. The Federal
Circuit assumed that Congress had the power to subject the states to patent
infringement suits, explicitly refusing to address the issue of whether Congress had
the authority under the Patent Clause to subject the states to patent infringement
suits. See id. at 334.
88 See id. at 334-35 ("[The general term 'whoever' was not the unmistakable
language of congressional intent necessary to abrogate Eleventh Amendment
immunity."). The court concluded that the relevant patent laws did not provide a
statutory definition for the term "whoever," and the statutory language made no
mention of the states. See id.
89 See id. at 335. The court rejected the plaintiffs argument that an exclusive
federal remedy in which federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction was a basis to
support abrogation. See id.
90 See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
91 See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
92 The legislative history of the PRCA states that
[a] public school such as UCLA can sue a private school such as USC for
patent infringement, yet USC cannot sue UCLA for the same act... State
universities should not have an unjustified advantage in the commercial
arena over private universities for funding because of the potential for
immunity from patent infringement actions.
S. REP. No. 102-280, at 9 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3087, 3092.
93 See id. at 7 ("To remedy the application of Atascadero to intellectual property
laws, Senator DeConcini introduced [the PRCA] to explicitly establish that Congress
did intend to subject States to patent infiingement suits in Federal court.").
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defined the term "whoever" in section 271 to include the states,
instrumentalities of the states, and any officer or employee of a
state acting in his official capacity. 94 Furthermore, by adding 35
U.S.C. § 296, Congress expressly stated that it was abrogating
Eleventh Amendment immunity.95
Congress claimed its authority to enact the PRCA under the
Commerce Clause, the Patent Clause, and section five of the
Fourteenth Amendment.96 Relying on the Supreme Court's still-
valid decision in Union Gas Co.,97 Congress reiterated that the
states, by ratifying the Constitution, granted Congress plenary
authority to regulate interstate commerce and therefore had
surrendered their sovereign immunity in that regard.98
Secondly, since Congress was granted exclusive authority over
patents under the Patent Clause, Congress concluded that
abrogation "logically falls within [its] power to protect patent
holders."99 In addition, noting that federal courts had previously
concluded that patents are property, Congress asserted that the
PRCA was an "acceptable method of enforcing the provisions of
the [F]ourteenth Amendment,"100  which prohibits the
government from depriving an individual of property without
94 The statute provides:
As used in this section, the term "whoever" includes any State, any
instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a State or
instrumentality of a State acting in his official capacity. Any State, and
any such instrumentality, officer, or employee, shall be subject to the
provisions of this title in the same manner and to the same extent as any
nongovernmental entity.
35 U.S.C. § 271(h) (1994).
95 According to the statute:
Any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a
State or instrumentality of a state acting in his official capacity, shall not
be immune, under the [E]leventh [A]mendment of the Constitution of the
United States or under any other doctrine of sovereign immunity, from suit
in federal court by any person, including any governmental or
nongovernmental entity, for infringement of a patent under section 271, or
for any other violation under this title.
35 U.S.C. § 296(a) (1994).
96 See S. REP. No. 102-280, at 7-8.
97 In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), Justice Brennan,
writing for the majority, held that Congress had the authority, pursuant to the
Commerce Clause, to render states liable for money damages in federal court under
CERCLA. The Court later overruled this decision in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44 (1996).





due process of law. Soon after Congress enacted the PRCA, the
Federal Circuit held that the PRCA validly abrogated state
sovereign immunity from suits under the patent laws. 10 1
In its decision, announced on June 23, 1999, a five-justice
majority of the Supreme Court held that, by enacting sections
271(h) and 296, Congress overstepped its Constitutional
authority and therefore invalidly abrogated the states' immunity
in patent cases. 0 2 This case formed part of a trio of narrowly
decided Supreme Court decisions, rendered on the same day,
amplifying the sovereign immunity of states from federal laws. 10 3
HI. FLORIDA PREPALD POSTSECONDARYEDUCATION EXPENSE
BOARD V. COLLEGE SAVINGS BANK
A. Facts
College Savings Bank (CSB) is a New Jersey-chartered
savings bank located in Princeton, New Jersey.10 4 In January
1988, CSB was granted a patent for CollegeSure, a tuition pre-
payment program administered according to a patented
computerized method'05 designed to ensure a return adequate to
101 See Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 998 F.2d 931, 939-49 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(analyzing the PRCA and holding that a state university was not immune from
patent suit in federal court).
102 See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank,
527 U.S. 627, 636, 646-48 (1999).
103 See College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
527 U.S. 666 (1999) (representing the companion case to Florida Prepaid, in which
the Court, by a vote of 5-4, expressly overruled the Parden constructive waiver
doctrine, and held that Florida's sovereign immunity was neither validly abrogated
by the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act, nor voluntarily waived by the state's
activities in interstate commerce); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding, by
a vote of 5-4 that, without its consent, the State of Maine was immune to suit in
state court, in an action alleging a violation of the provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act).
104 See College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
948 F. Supp. 400, 401 (1996), affd, 148 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 1998), rev'd, 527 U.S.
627 (1999).
105 See U.S. Patent No. 4,722,055 (issued Jan. 26, 1988). The patent, entitled
"Methods and Apparatus for Funding Liability of Uncertain Costs," discloses a
method for establishing an investment program that provides investors a future
return sufficient to pay the expenses for the college education of a beneficiary in
return for a present investment, which is determined on the basis of current college
tuition data and projections of the rate of increase of college costs. See College Say.
Bank, 948 F. Supp. at 401 n.1.
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satisfy college education expenses. 10 6  In September 1988,
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary 'Education Expense Board
("Florida Prepaid"), an arm of the Florida state government,
began administering an investment program aimed at aiding
individuals in funding the cost of attending public colleges and
universities in Florida. 10 7 CSB sued Florida Prepaid under the
PRCA in the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey in November 1994, alleging infringement under the
PRCA. 0 8
While the lawsuits were pending, the United States
Supreme Court handed down its decision in Seminole Tribe.10 9
In light of that decision, Florida Prepaid moved to dismiss CSB's
suits on sovereign immunity grounds.110 Florida Prepaid argued
that the PRCA was an unconstitutional attempt by Congress to
abrogate state immunity pursuant to Congress's Article I powers
under the Patent Clause."' Florida Prepaid also argued that the
PRCA did not constitute appropriate legislation pursuant to
section five of the Fourteenth Amendment because it was not
aimed at remedying the types of actions prohibited by the
Amendment.112 The United States government intervened to
defend the constitutionality of the PRCA.113 The district court
denied Florida Prepaid's motion to dismiss the patent
infringement claim, concluding that Congress had
unambiguously abrogated the states' immunity in the PRCA,
and that the PRCA constituted "appropriate legislation" under
section five of the Fourteenth Amendment. 114
106 See id. at 401.
107 See id.
108 CSB later brought a second suit in the same court alleging that Florida
Prepaid violated Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994),
through alleged misstatements about Florida's own programs in its brochures and
annual reports.
109 517 U.S. 44 (1996); see supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text (discussing
the Seminole Tribe decision).




114 See id. at 426. In the cause of action alleging a violation of the Lanham Act,
the district court held that the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act (TRCA), 15
U.S.C. 1122(a)-(b) (1994), which like the PRCA, provided that no state or state
instrumentality was immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, was an
unconstitutional attempt to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment. See College Say. Bank, 948 F. Supp. at 427-28. The district
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On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's
decision, 115 holding that Congress, by enacting the PRCA, clearly
expressed an intent to abrogate state immunity in suits under
the patent laws, and had done so pursuant to its section five
authority to enforce the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 116 The Federal Circuit rejected Florida Prepaid's
argument that the goal of the statute, to prevent states from
infringing patents and subsequently asserting the defense of
sovereign immunity when sued for infringement, was not a
legitimate objective under the Fourteenth Amendment.117
Florida Prepaid sought review by the U.S. Supreme Court,
arguing that subjecting states to patent infringement suits
"contravenes fundamental tenets of federalism and imposes
unconstitutional burdens on the states that should not be
permitted without review by this Court."118 Furthermore, Florida
Prepaid contended that since patent rights were created in
Article I of the Constitution, Congress could not rely on the
Fourteenth Amendment to enforce those rights against the
states.119 The Supreme Court granted certiorari. 120
B. Holding and Rationale
The Supreme Court, in an opinion delivered by Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist, reversed the judgment of the Federal
Circuit.'2 1 As a threshold issue, the Court rejected CSB's
argument that Florida Prepaid had impliedly waived its
sovereign immunity.122  The Court noted that the Parden
court's decision regarding the TRCA was subsequently upheld by the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals, 131 F.3d 353 (3d Cir. 1997), and by the Supreme Court in College
Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, 527 U.S.
666 (1999). Analysis of the TRCA and the Supreme Court's decision in College
Savings Bank is beyond the scope of this Comment and is dealt with only to the
extent that it pertains to the doctrine of constructive waiver. See infra notes 309-15.
11s See College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
148 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 1998), rev'd, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
116 See id. at 1355.
117 See id. at 1349-52.
118 Bank, Justice Department Urge High Court To Deny Review Of Sovereign
Immunity Case, MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: INTELL. PROP., PATENTS, Dec. 7, 1998
(quoting from Florida Prepaid's petition for Supreme Court review).
119 See id.
120 See 525 U.S. 1064 (1999).
121 See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank,
527 U.S. 627 (1999).
122 See id. at 635. In responding to Florida Prepaid's motion to dismiss, CSB
2000]
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doctrine of constructive waiver 123 had been expressly overruled
in the companion Supreme Court decision in College Savings
Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense
Board.124
Applying the Seminole Tribe two-prong test to determine
whether Congress had validly abrogated the states' sovereign
immunity,125 the Court concluded that in enacting the PRCA,
Congress made its intention to abrogate the states' sovereign
immunity "unmistakably clear in the language of the statute."126
The Court held, however, that Congress, in abrogating the
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity, had not validly acted
under a constitutional grant of power. Although in Seminole
Tribe, the narrow issue was whether Congress could abrogate
the states' sovereign immunity under the Indian Commerce
Clause of Article I, here, the Court expanded the Seminole Tribe
ruling and stated that "Congress may not abrogate state
sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I powers." 127
Extending its holding in Seminole Tribe, the Court concluded
that in seeking to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity,
Congress could not use its powers under either the Interstate
Commerce Clause or the Patent Clause to enact the PRCA.128
had argued "that Florida Prepaid waived its sovereign immunity either by
participating in the patent system or by failing to raise the sovereign immunity
defense in the litigation." College Say. Bank, 148 F.3d at 1345. The district court
held that "the Parden doctrine cannot apply to eliminate Florida Prepaid's
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment." College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 948 F. Supp. 400, 420 (D.N.J. 1996). The Federal
Circuit, however, did not reach the constructive waiver argument raised by CSB.
See College Say. Bank, 148 F.3d at 1345.
123 See Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964), overruled by College Sav.
Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); see
also supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text (discussing the Parden doctrine of
constructive waiver).
124 527 U. S. 666 (1999). The College Savings Bank decision resulted from CSB's
appeal from the dismissal of its suit alleging that Florida Prepaid had violated the
Lanham Act through alleged misstatements about Florida's own programs in its
brochures and annual reports. In College Savings Bank, the Supreme Court stated
that "the constructive-waiver experiment of Parden was ill conceived, and [we] see
no merit in attempting to salvage any remnant of it... [and] [wihatever may
remain of our decision in Parden is expressly overruled." Id. at 680.
125 See supra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing the Seminole Tribe
two-prong test).
128 Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 635.
127 Id. at 636.
128 See id.
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As it did in Seminole Tribe, the Court reaffirmed that
"Congress retains the authority to abrogate state sovereign
inmmunity pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment."129 The
Court determined that patents may be considered a form of
property within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 30 While recognizing that "appropriate"
legislation pursuant to section five of the Fourteenth
Amendment could be enacted to abrogate the states' sovereign
immunity, the Court stated that "the legislation must
nonetheless be 'appropriate' under [section five] as that term was
construed in City of Boerne."131 "[F]or Congress to invoke
[section] 5, it must identify conduct transgressing the
Fourteenth Amendment's substantive provisions, and must
tailor its legislative scheme to remedying or preventing such
conduct."132 The Court concluded that the PRCA's abrogation of
the states' sovereign immunity could not be sustained as
"appropriate" legislation enacted to enforce the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 33
In analyzing the legislative history of the PRCA, the Court
found that the underlying conduct that gave rise to its
enactment was "state infringement of patents and the use of
sovereign immunity to deny patent owners compensation for the
invasion of their patent rights."134 The Court found, however,
that Congress, in enacting the PRCA, "identified no pattern of
patent infringement by the States, let alone a pattern of
constitutional violations." 135 It observed that "[t]he legislative
record... suggests that the [PRCA] does not respond to a history
of 'widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional rights'
of the sort Congress has faced in enacting proper prophylactic
[section five] legislation."136  The Court was particularly
129 Id. at 637.
130 See id. at 642.
131 Id. at 637. For a discussion of the City of the Boerne decision, see supra notes
69-78 and accompanying text.
132 Id. at 639.
133 See id. at 646-47.
134 Id. at 640.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 645 (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 526 (1997))
(emphasis added). The Court further contended that "Congress appears to have
enacted this legislation in response to a handful of instances of state patent
infringement that do not necessarily violate the Constitution." Id. at 645-46. The
Court also noted that "the Rlegislative] record at best offers scant support for
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unimpressed with the Federal Circuit's finding of "only eight
patent-infringement suits prosecuted against the states in the
110 years between 1880 and 199O."137 In addition, the Court
found that testimony before the House Subcommittee in favor of
the bill which became the PRCA acknowledged that the states
are capable of respecting patent rights.138 Moreover, the Court
found that the Senate Report accompanying the bill contained no
evidence that unremedied patent infringement by the states had
become a national problem.139
Besides noting the lack of legislative history supporting the
need for prophylactic legislation, the Court stated that under the
"clear import" of its precedent,
[a] State's infringement of a patent, though interfering with a
patent owner's right to exclude others, does not by itself violate
the Constitution. Instead, only where the State provides no
remedy, or only inadequate remedies, to injured patent owners
for its infringement of their patent could a deprivation of
property without due process result.140
The Court, therefore, chided Congress for barely considering
the availability of alternative state remedies for patent
infringement.' 4 ' Furthermore, the Court stated that the limited
amount of testimony regarding the availability of state remedies
did not prove that "state remedies were constitutionally
Congress'[s] conclusion that States were depriving patent owners of property
without due process of law by pleading sovereign immunity in federal-court patent
actions." Id. at 646.
137 Id. at 640. The Federal Circuit acknowledged that the legislative record of
the PRCA did not "contain[] indications that the extent of previous patent
infringement by states had... risen to emergency level." College Say. Bank v.
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 148 F.3d 1343, 1353 (Fed. Cir.
1998), rev'd, 527 U.S. 627 (1999). The Federal Circuit, however, found that the
legislative history does reflect a recognition that "as commercialization of basic
research continues, particularly in the biotechnology field, state universities are
becoming increasingly more active in the commerce of intellectual property, and,
naturally, an increase in the number of patent suits against the States likely will
ensue." Id. at 1354. (citations omitted). The Supreme Court, apparently
concentrating instead on the limited number of actual infringement suits prosecuted
against states up until enactment of the PRCA, dismissed as speculative, the
testimony before Congress that patent infringement by the states would increase in
the future. See Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 641.
138 See Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 640.
139 See id. at 641.
140 Id. at 643 (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981); Hudson v. Palmer,
468 U.S. 517 (1984)).
141 See id. at 644.
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inadequate, but rather that they were less convenient than
federal remedies, and might undermine the uniformity of patent
law." 142
Thus, the Court found that the primary motive behind
Congress's enactment of the PRCA was to maintain a uniform
remedy for patent infringement and promote uniformity in the
application of the patent laws. 143 The Court observed that such
concerns were proper under the Patent Clause of Article I, but,
following Seminole Tribe, Congress could not use its Article I
powers to justify and support abrogation of the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity.'4
Lastly, the Court concluded that the PRCA was not limited
to remedying or preventing unconstitutional state action.145 The
Court noted that "a state actor's negligent act that causes
unintended injury to a person's property does not 'deprive' that
person of property within the meaning of the Due Process
Clause."146 Noting that patent infringement may be inadvertent,
unintentional and without knowledge of the patent, 47 the Court
observed that the PRCA did not focus on instances of intentional
or reckless infringement, but rather, subjected a state to suit for
negligent or unintentional infringement as well.148 The Court
therefore concluded that the PRCA was not focused on due
process violations. 49 Furthermore, the Court criticized Congress
for not confining the reach of the PRCA to instances of non-
negligent infringement, or to states with a high incidence of
infringement that provide questionable remedies. 150 The Court
142 Id. The Court noted that "the State of Florida provides remedies to patent
owners for alleged infringement on the part of the State ... [through either] a
legislative remedy [of] a claims bill.., or a judicial remedy through a takings or
conversion claim." Id. at n.9. For a discussion regarding the importance of uniform
patent laws and remedies, and a criticism of the Court's dismissal of uniformity as a
valid due process concern, see infra notes 221-23 and accompanying text.
143 See Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 644-45.
14 See id. at 648.
145 See id. at 646-47.
146 See id. at 645 (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986)).
147 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. Knowledge and intent are
relevant only in determining contributory infringement and the measure of
damages. See Trell v. Marlee Electronics Corp., 912 F.2d 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(contributory infringement); State Industries, Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d
1226 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (damages).
148 See Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 645.
149 See id.
150 See id. at 647.
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concluded that "[i]n sum, it simply cannot be said that 'many of
[the acts of infringement] affected by the congressional
enactment have a significant likelihood of being
unconstitutional.' "151 Accordingly, the Court struck down the
PRCA, holding that it was not "appropriate" legislation to
enforce the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 52  Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas joined the Court's opinion.
C. The Dissent
The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Stevens, argued
that "[gliven the absence of effective state remedies for patent
infringement by States and the statutory pre-emption of such
state remedies, [the PRCA] was an appropriate exercise of
Congress'[s] power under [section five] of the Fourteenth
Amendment to prevent state deprivations of property without
due process of law."153 The dissent noted the strong federal
interest in the uniform interpretation of the patent laws, and
criticized the Court for relegating this valid concern as a mere
factor that belongs to the Article I Patent Clause calculus.154
The dissent likewise supported Congress's decision "to abrogate
state sovereign immunity in patent infringement cases in order
151 Id. (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1996) (alteration in
original)).
152 See id. at 647-48. Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
Federal Circuit and remanded the case back to the Federal Circuit for further
proceedings. See id. at 648. On remand, the Federal Circuit stated: "We are
unaware of any ground upon which College Savings Bank's patent infringement
could proceed, in light of the Supreme Court decision in this case." College Sav.
Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 1999 U.S. LEXIS 20006,
at *1 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 2, 1999). The Federal Circuit remanded the case to the district
court "to determine if any such ground exists: and, '[i]fnot.... to dismiss the patent
infringement claim.' "Id. at *1-2.
153 Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 649 (Stevens, J., dissenting). While the
majority referred to possible state remedies, the dissent stressed the lack of effective
alternative state remedies. In regards to preemption, the dissent suggested that
section 1338, which grants federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over patent
infringement actions, might preempt state remedies. See id. at 649, 658 n.10. See
infra notes 201-10 and accompanying text (discussing federal preemption of state
remedies for patent infringement).
154 See Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 652. The dissent noted that the need for
national uniformity in interpreting patent law led Congress to vest exclusive
jurisdiction over patent cases in the federal courts and vest exclusive jurisdiction




to close a potential loophole in the uniform [patent law] scheme,
which, if undermined, would necessarily decrease the efficacy of
the process afforded to patent holders."155
The dissent criticized the Court's suggestion that a state's
infringement of a patent does not necessarily amount to a
deprivation within the meaning of the Due Process Clause
because infringement may occur through mere negligent
conduct. 156 The dissent voiced its skepticism over whether the
standard for due process "deprivations" announced in Daniels v.
Williams157 applies to deprivations of patent rights.158 In any
event, as the dissent observed, CSB alleged that Florida
Prepaid's infringement was willful, and since most patent
infringers are put on notice that their conduct may be actionable,
infringement actions based on mere negligence rarely occur.159
The dissent further contended that Congress heard
testimony and considered prior case law concerning inadequate
state remedies for patent infringement when Congress
considered the PRCA, including Chew v. California.160
Moreover, the dissent found that since 1992, there have been
numerous patent suits involving states and their
instrumentalities, especially state universities. 161 In addition,
165 Id.
166 See id. at 653.
157 474 U.S 327 (1986). In Daniels, an inmate in a Virginia jail brought an
action in federal district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking to recover damages
for injuries allegedly sustained when he slipped on a pillow negligently left on a
stairway by the sheriffs deputy. The Court stated that, historically, a "deprivation"
of property within the meaning of the Due Process Clause "has been applied to
deliberate decisions of government officials to deprive a person of life, liberty, or
property." Id. at 331.
158 See Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 653.
159 See Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 654 n.5.
160 See id. at 655. For a discussion of the Chew case and of the scope of patent
law regarding infringment suits against the states prior to the enactment of the
PRCA, see supra notes 85-92.
161 See Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 656. Furthermore, the dissent noted that
the states and their instrumentalities are heavily involved in the federal patent
system; that more than 2,000 patents were issued to public and private universities;
that license royalty earnings at United States universities totaled over $273 million
in 1995, a 12% increase over the previous year; that the State of Florida has
obtained over 200 United States patents since 1995; and that all 50 states own or
have obtained patents. See id. at 656-57. The majority stressed the limited number
of actual infringement suits prosecuted against states up until enactment of the
PRCA, and dismissed as speculative the testimony before Congress that patent
infringement by the states would increase in the future. See id. at 641. In hindsight,
it is clear that Congress's concern regarding the increasing instances of patent suits
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the dissent noted that since state court jurisdiction over patent
infringement suits is preempted by federal law,162 Congress
could reasonably assume, without reviewing the remedies
available in each state, that any state remedies were nonexistent
or inadequate. 63
Even if state remedies for patent infringement are
theoretically available, the dissent opined that given the
inexperience of state judges in hearing patent infringement
actions and the fact that state court opinions in patent
infringement cases would not be appealable to the Federal
Circuit, "it would have been 'appropriate' for Congress to
conclude that [state remedies] would not guarantee patentees
due process in infringement actions against state defendants."' 64
The dissent criticized the majority's insistence that Congress
must find widespread and persisting deprivations of
constitutional rights in order to enact legislation pursuant to
section five of the Fourteenth Amendment as a threat to "read
Congress's power to pass prophylactic legislation out of [section
five] altogether."165  In the dissent's view, "Congress had
sufficient evidence of due process violations, whether actual or
potential, to meet the requirement... expressed in City of
Boerne that Congress can act under [section five] only to 'remedy
or prevent unconstitutional actions.' "166 The dissent found a
precise congruence between the "ends" of eliminating the risk
that the defense of sovereign immunity will deprive patentees of
property without due process of law and the "means" of
abrogating state sovereign immunity in patent suits. 167 The
involving states was not speculative, but rather, prescient. See id. at 657 (noting
specific instances of patent suits involving a state or state instrumentality).
162 See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1994) ("Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the
courts of the states in patent, plant variety protection and copyright cases.").
163 See Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 658.
164 Id. at 659. The dissent observed that even if state courts were permitted to
entertain infringement actions when a state is named as a defendant, it would be
doubtful whether a state court could be required to hear such a case in light of the
Court's decision in Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999), which held that Congress
could not subject a state to suit in state court, without its consent, in an action
alleging a violation of federal law. See infra notes 202-04 and accompanying text
(discussing Alden and its application to the present case). Ironically, the Alden
decision was announced the same day as Florida Prepaid.
165 Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 660.
166 Id. (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997)) (emphasis
added).
167 See id. at 662. The dissent argued that if infringement by state actors is
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dissent concluded, therefore, that the concerns that formed the
basis for the Court's decision in City of Boerne168 were not
implicated in this case.
Raising a constructive waiver argument, the dissent
asserted that "a State like Florida that has invoked the benefits
of the federal patent system should be deemed to have waived
any defense of sovereign immunity in patent litigation."169
Lastly, the dissent voiced its continuing disagreement with the
holding in Seminole Tribe,170 stating that Congress was "fully
justified in assuming that it had ample authority [under
Article I] to abrogate sovereign immunity defenses to federal
claims."171 Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined the
dissenting opinion.
D. Analysis
It is submitted that Congress must have broad power to
protect the intellectual property rights of patent owners and to
enforce valid patent rights. This congressional power is
necessary to further a significant public policy objective and to
foster and promote the development of technology. It is asserted
that congressional power must include the authority to abrogate
state sovereign immunity17 2 in lawsuits brought under the
indeed rare, then the PRCA would operate only in those rare cases. See id. In
addition, if such infringements are or become common, then the PRCA would
"likewise expand in precise harmony with the growth of the problem that Congress
anticipated and sought to prevent." Id. at 662-63.
168 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1996) (altering Seminole Tribe's two-
prong test for determining whether Congress enacted "appropriate" legislation
pursuant to section five of the Fourteenth Amendment). The Court stated that there
must be "congruence" and "proportionality" between the legislation and the injury it
is designed to remedy. Id. at 520.
169 See Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 664 n.16.
170 Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
171 Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 665. The dissent further stated that "[tihe full
reach of [Seminole Tribe's] dramatic expansion of the judge-made doctrine of
sovereign immunity is unpredictable; its dimensions are defined only by the present
majority's perception of constitutional penumbras rather than constitutional text."
Id.
172 This of course assumes the existence of state sovereign immunity, broadly
conceived. The broad conception of "sovereign immunity" has sparked significant
dissenting opinions in landmark court decisions. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S.
at 101-185 (Souter, J., dissenting) (utilizing an intent-of-the-Framers argument
that states never enjoyed sovereign immunity in federal courts); Atascadero State
Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 286-89 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing
that state immunity should not apply in federal court for federal causes of action).
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patent laws, and that the PRCA was a valid exercise by Congress
to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. This
Comment presents four bases upon which the PRCA was a valid
exercise of congressional power. The states' involvement in
intellectual property disputes poses an increasing problem as
states and their instrumentalities become increasingly more
active in the commerce of intellectual property. Therefore, the
Court's holding in Florida Prepaid significantly diminishes
Congress's ability to provide needed remedies against the states
for aggrieved intellectual property owners.
1. The PRCA-A Valid Exercise of Congressional Authority
It is submitted that Congress acted constitutionally when it
passed the PRCA, seeking to abrogate state sovereign immunity
in patent infringement claims. As the Supreme Court in Florida
Prepaid found, section 296 of the PRCA 73 satisfied the first
prong of the Seminole Tribe test by expressly manifesting
Congress's intent to abrogate state immunity in "unmistakably
clear" language in the statute.174 Therefore, this Comment
focuses primarily upon the second prong of the Seminole Tribe
test: Whether Congress acted under a valid exercise of power. 175
In Fitzpatrick, the Court stated that when Congress uses its
section five enforcement power, it exercises its authority under
one section of the Fourteenth Amendment, whose other sections
function as limitations on state authority.176  In order to
determine whether Congress enacted section 296 pursuant to its
enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment, it is
necessary to examine the legislative history of the enactment.177
173 See 35 U.S.C. § 296(a) (1994) ("[A] State... shall not be immune, under the
eleventh amendment of the Constitution of the United States or under any other
doctrine of sovereign immunity from suit in Federal court.").
174 See Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 635 (citation omitted).
175 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 57-58 ("[W]e turn now to consider whether
the Act was passed 'pursuant to a valid exercise of power.' ") (quoting Green v.
Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985)).
176 See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976). In Seminole Tribe, the
Court, reaffirmed that principle by stating that since the Fourteenth Amendment
explicitly places limitations on the states, Congress's authority under the
Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity is undisputed.
See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 71-72 n.15.
177 See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529-36 (1997). While
contrasting RFRA and the Voting Rights Act, the Court stated, "RFRA's legislative
record lacks examples of modem instances of generally applicable laws passed
because of religious bigotry." Id. at 530.
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The Senate report states that section 296 should be
characterized as an exercise of Congress's Fourteenth
Amendment enforcement authority. 78  The United States
Supreme Court, in City of Boerne, reiterated that section five "is
'a positive grant of legislative power' to Congress."179 The Court
further stated that section five gives Congress broad discretion
to determine "whether and what legislation is needed to secure
the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment," and that
Congress's judgment in this area "[is] entitled to much
deference."180 Moreover, the Court has repeatedly recognized
that "'legislation which deters or remedies constitutional
violations can fall within the sweep of Congress'[s] enforcement
power even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not
itself unconstitutional and intrudes into legislative spheres of
autonomy previously reserved to the States.'"181 Therefore,
Congress may validly abrogate .the states' sovereign immunity
from patent suits in federal court, so long as such abrogation is
deemed "appropriate" legislation to enforce the substantive
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. And this would be
true even if not every instance of patent infringement by a state
or its instrumentalities would constitute a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, this Comment presents
several theories to support the constitutional viability of the
PRCA as a valid exercise of congressional power to abrogate
state sovereign immunity and thereby enforce the provisions of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
2. Procedural Due Process
It is well settled that the rights secured by a patent are
property no different from other forms of property. 8 2 The grant
178 See S. REP. No. 102-280, at 8 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3087,
3094. "[Ihe bill is justified as an acceptable method of enforcing the provisions of
the fourteenth amendment." Id.
179 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 517 (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S.
641, 651 (1966)).
180 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536.
181 Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 282-83 (1999) (emphasis added)
(quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518); cf City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S.
156, 177 (1980) ("It is clear ... that under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment Congress
may prohibit practices that in and of themselves do not violate § 1 of the
Amendment, so long as the prohibitions attacking racial discrimination in voting
are 'appropriate.' ").
182 See Machine Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 121 (1877) ("Rights secured to an
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of the patent allows its owner to exclude others, including a
state,183 from making, using, or selling an invention described
and claimed in the patent for a certain period of time,18 4 or
practicing the inventions described and claimed in the patent.8 5
Accordingly, patent owners are entitled to protection against
deprivations without due process of law and therefore, Congress
is authorized to act under its Enforcement Clause powers to
secure that protection.
The Supreme Court nonetheless stated that the PRCA was
not "appropriate" legislation to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment. 86 The Court found that the "historical record and
the scope of coverage... [made] it clear that the [PRCA could
not] be sustained under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment."187
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision, the Federal Circuit
noted significant instances of alleged patent infringement by
states or state entities. 88 Moreover, Congress expressly stated
its concern that in light of the Federal Circuit's decision in Chew,
no remedy was available for patent owners to obtain
compensation for a state's unlicensed use of patent property 8 9
Prior to enacting the PRCA, Congress "review[ed] some of the
decided cases to get a picture of the extent to which arms of the
States are involved in commercial activity involving patented
technology."190 Recent history shows that Congress was correct
inventor by letters-patent are property .... ).
183 Cf Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 560 (1973) ("When Congress grants
an exclusive right or monopoly, its effects are pervasive; no citizen or State may
escape its reach.") (analyzing the Copyright Clause of the Federal Constitution).
184 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974).
185 See id.; see also Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539 (1852). Cf. Kaiser Aetna
v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (stating that the right to exclude from
real property is among the "most essential sticks in this bundle of rights that are
commonly characterized as property").
186 See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank,
527 U.S. 627, 636, 645-47 (1999).
187 Id. at 647.
188 See College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Educ. Expense Bd., 148 F.3d 1343,
1353-54 (Fed. Cir. 1998), rev'd, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (citing examples of state
infringement mentioned in the Congressional subcommittee hearings).
189 According to Congress,
[tihe [Chew] court found that the patent statute used only the general term
of "whoever" when stating what parties were subject to suit for patent
infringement.... By permitting the sovereign immunity defense to deny
Chew recovery, the plaintiff was literally left without any recourse.
S. REP. No. 102-280, at 6 (1992).
190 Patent Remedy Clarification Act: Hearing on H.R. 3886 Before the Subcomm.
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in forecasting that state involvement in the area of patent law
would increase. 19' Congress heard testimony that state entities
seeking an advantage in the lucrative market of intellectual
property might be tempted by sovereign immunity to infringe
patent rights. 92
The Supreme Court criticized the legislative record, as
failing to support a finding that state infringement had become a
problem of "national import."193  The Court's criticism is
especially ironic in light of the fact that on the very next day
after its Florida Prepaid decision was handed down, the
Supreme Court vacated a Federal Circuit judgment involving a
patent suit against a state entity 94 and remanded the case for
further consideration in light of its decision in College Savings
Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense
on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 101st Cong., at 30 (1990). [hereinafter Patent Remedy Clarification
Act] The hearings reflect an expectation of increasing state involvement in patent
litigation:
[The cases where sovereign immunity could be a defense are very likely to
grow in number. State universities are joining the rush to commercialize
the results of basic science in ever-growing numbers. This trend is
especially apparent in the biotechnology industry, and to a lesser extent in
fields such as material science and computer software. As the universities
do so, they move further and further into the commercial realm, making it
more likely that they will be involved in an increasing amount of patent
litigation.
Id. at 36-37.
191 See, e.g., Genentech, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 143 F.3d 1446, 1454
n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1998), vacated and remanded by 527 U.S. 1031 (1999) (noting that in
1994, the University of California was receiving over $50 million in royalties, and
filed over 380 patent applications); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and
Private Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored
Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663 (1996) (noting that universities are obtaining an
increasing number of patents); Tammy L. Lewis & Lisa A. Vincler, Storming the
Ivory Tower: The Competing Interests of the Public's Right to Know and Protecting
the Integrity of University Research, 20 J.C. & U.L. 417, 429-30 n.59 (1994) ("In
total, American universities were issued 1,346 patents in 1991, an increase of 117%
from the 619 issued in 1986.").
192 See Patent Remedy Clarification Act, supra note 190, at 57 ("Our fear is that
if current legal immunity continues, states will begin to disregard, perhaps
carelessly, patent rights, and perhaps in time to knowingly infringe patent rights.")
(statement of William S. Thompson, President of the American Intellectual Property
Law Association).
193 See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank,
527 U.S. 627, 641 (1999). The Court contended that, "[alt most, Congress heard
testimony that patent infringement by States might increase in the future... and
acted to head off this speculative harm." Id
194 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Genentech, Inc., 527 U.S. 1031 (1999).
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Board.195 In any event, this judicial criticism departs sharply
from the Court's jurisprudence according Congressional
determinations "much deference."196
The Court's criticism of the congressional record is
significant because it substantially narrows Congress's
legitimate authority under section five to enforce the substantive
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. In effect, the Court
has instructed Congress to wait until patent infringement by
state entities reaches emergency levels before intervening
through legislation. Logic and precedent, however, dictate that
Congress should not be forced to sit idly while deprivations of
patent holders' property rights reach the widespread magnitude
of racial discrimination in the 1960s. One of the main purposes
of the Enforcement Clause legislation is deterring constitutional
violations.197 Congress must be authorized to enact legislation to
ensure that constitutional violations do not occur or continue to
occur. Accordingly, legislation pursuant to section five of the
Fourteenth Amendment can be prospective, and Congress was
entitled to conclude that "appropriate" legislation was necessary
to protect federal patent property rights-even absent evidence
of egregious and widespread patent infringement by state
entities in the past.
The Court emphasized that the deprivation of a
constitutionally protected interest by a state entity violates the
Constitution only when such deprivation occurs without due
process of law. 198 Accordingly, as the Court observed, patent
195 See id. at 1031. Relying on the doctrine of constructive waiver, the Federal
Circuit held that the University had consented to suit in federal court and waived
its immunity as an arm of the state. In College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Education Expense Board, 527 U.S. 666, 680 (1999), the Supreme
Court expressly overruled the constructive waiver doctrine. For a further discussion
of the Genentech litigation, see infra note 313.
196 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997). In City of Boerne, the
Court reiterated that "[iut is for Congress in the first instance to 'determin[e]
whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment,' and its conclusions are entitled to much deference." Id. (quoting
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 640, 651 (1966)) (alteration in original). Cf. Turner
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195-96 (1997) (emphasizing the superiority
of legislative bodies in making predictive judgments).
197 See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518 ("Legislation which deters or remedies
constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Congress'[s] enforcement
power[s] .... ") (emphasis added).




infringement is not unconstitutional per se.199 The Court,
therefore, faulted Congress for failing to consider possible
alternative state remedies.200 A threshold issue, which the
dissent keenly noted, concerns the unambiguous language of 28
U.S.C. § 1338, which grants federal district courts exclusive
subject matter jurisdiction over patent infringement suits. Since
federal courts have exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over
patent disputes, Congress could legitimately conclude that state
remedies for patent infringement were either non-existent or
preempted by section 1338.201 The Court's decision does not
address the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. The decision,
however, by legitimizing state alternative remedies such as a
taking claim, seems to suggest that as long as the state remedy
is not called an "infringement" action, it is not preempted by
section 1338. Whether a majority of the Supreme Court would
hold that preemption of state alternative remedies turns on the
mere form of the action is unclear. But since substance overrides
form, an infringement action clothed in a state-based "taking"
claim is still an infringement action. Accordingly, a state-based
taking claim involving a patent is preempted by the grant of
exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts over patent disputes.
The Court's insistence that patent holders seek alternative
state remedies for patent infringement seems disingenuous in
light of its decision in Alden v. Maine.2 2 In Alden, the Court
held that without the State's consent to suit, the State of Maine
was immune in a state court suit brought by state workers
alleging a violation of the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA).203 Alden therefore casts doubt on whether state
courts may entertain actions against the states for alleged
"taking" of federally granted property. Relying on Alden, a state
199 See id. ("[U]nder the plain terms of the [Due Process] Clause and the clear
import of our precedent, a State's infringement of a patent, though interfering with
a patent owner's right to exclude others, does not by itself violate the
Constitution.").
200 See id.
201 See id. at 646 n.10; see also College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 148 F.3d 1343, 1350 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1998) rev'd
527 U.S. 627 (1999) (noting that "[t]he Supreme Court has not indicated whether a
takings claim based on patent infringement is cognizable in state courts in light of
the fact that Congress has declared [in 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a)] that claims arising
under federal patent law are within the exclusive province of the federal courts").
202 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
203 See id. at 712.
2000]
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entity may assert its Eleventh Amendment immunity in state
court as a defense to an action enforcing federal patent rights.
20 4
The Court's decision in Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats,
Inc.205 is especially relevant to Congress's legitimate concern that
state courts are preempted from hearing claims that, in
substance, are patent infringement claims. In Bonito Boats, the
Court invalidated a Florida statute that offered patent-like
rights for ideas that are not patentable under the federal patent
scheme. 206  Arguably, the Bonito Boats decision might be
distinguished because there was no actual federal patent at issue
and the state statute had the effect of granting patent-like rights
rather than creating pseudo-infringement actions to protect
federal patent rights. As the Bonito Boats Court stated,
however, the underlying rationale for its holding was not the
limited concern that a state might grant patent rights, but
rather, that "our past decisions have made clear that state
regulation of intellectual property must yield to the extent that it
clashes with the balance struck by Congress in our patent
laws."207  Every infringement action implicates the tension
between the opposing policy considerations of patent-monopoly
and free-market competition, and shifts the balance struck by
Congress in the patent laws one way or the other.20 8
204 The Alden decision does not completely shut the door on aggrieved state
workers because, as the Court noted, the United States may prosecute the litigation
on behalf of the plaintiffs. See id. at 755. In contrast, no such statutory
authorization exists for the federal government to prosecute on behalf of an
aggrieved patentee. Accordingly, an extension of Alden to takings or infringement
claims against the states in state court would leave patentees with a "right without
[any] remedy." Parden, 377 U.S. at 190 (holding that a state operating a common
carrier railroad in interstate commerce constituted a waiver of sovereign immunity).
205 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
206 See id. at 168 (citations omitted) (holding that the Florida statute is pre-
empted by the Supremacy Clause because it conflicts with a "strong federal policy
favoring free competition in ideas which do not merit patent protection"). In Bonito
Boats, the petitioner, who did not obtain federal patent protection for its
commercially successful hull design, sought damages, injunctive relief, accounting of
profits, and attorney fees against a Tennessee corporation for allegedly duplicating
its hull design by the method of reverse-engineering. See id. at 144-45.
207 Id. at 152 (emphasis added); see also Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating
Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 808-09 (1988) (stating that federal court jurisdiction extends to
cases in which "federal [patent] law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiffs
right of relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal
[patent] law") (citation omitted).
208 See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text (discussing the balance in the
patent laws between monopolies and free market competition).
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Accordingly, patent infringement suits, like the actual grant of a
patent, raise significant public policy issues involving the
regulation of intellectual property and likewise, implicates "the
[delicate] balance struck by Congress in our patent laws."20 9
Thus, the Bonito Boats decision supports the contention that
state courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over "taking" claims
involving infringement of federally-granted patents. 210
In any event, contrary to the Court's decision, Congress did
consider the questionable adequacy of state remedies. 211
Congress also considered, and apparently rejected, cumbersome
general tort claims that could conceivably be brought against a
state.212 Congress also heard testimony from the President of
the American Intellectual Property Law Association that only
federal remedies for patent infringement are truly effective.213
Moreover, Congress could reasonably conclude that state
court forums would not adequately serve to guarantee patentees'
due process rights in infringement actions against state
defendants. It is widely agreed that patent cases are unusually
complex and technically difficult.214 Over twenty-five years ago,
Judge Friendly observed that patents "are quite beyond the
209 Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 152.
210 A threshold issue that arises is whether the states are preempted from
exercising their eminent domain powers in condemning or taking patent property.
See infra Part I.D.3.
211 According to Congress:
[R]equiring a potential plaintiff (patentee) to ascertain the validity of her
claims under the differing substantive and procedural laws of the fifty
states may well prove a very substantial disincentive to the
commencement of such [infringement] suits. Moreover, it would vitiate a
major goal of the federal intellectual property system national uniformity.
In short these remedies are simply no substitute for patent infringement
actions.
Patent Remedy Clarification Act, supra note 190, at 34 (1990).
212 Congress stated:
[A] patentee.., would.., have to draft her cause of action as a general
tort claim-or perhaps one for restitution-to come within the [state]
statute. This might be impossible, [or] at least difficult.... Consequently,
relief under statutes such as these may not be a true alternative avenue of
recovery.
Id. at 33.
213 See id. at 47 (statement of William S. Thompson, President of the American
Intellectual Property Law Association) ("In this case there is no balance, since there
are no-or at least there are not very effective patent remedies at the State level.
The only effective remedies exist in the Federal courts.").
214 See generally HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL
VIEW 153 (1973).
20001
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
ability of the usual judge to understand without the expenditure
of an inordinate amount of educational effort by counsel and of
attempted self-education by the judge, and in many instances,
even with it."215 State judges have not had the experience with
patent suits that federal judges have honed for close to 200
years. 216 Indeed, Congress heard direct testimony relating to the
unfamiliarity of state judges with patent cases. 217 Therefore,
Congress legitimately decided that consigning patent holders to
the patchwork remedies of the states would place undue burdens
upon the proper adjudication of patent cases. If, for example, a
patent holder received an unfavorable judgment under some
alternative state remedy, the patent holder might question the
adequacy of the "process" accorded to him or her. Federal courts
would then be called upon to decide whether the post-deprivation
state remedy satisfied the requirements of "due process." Such a
scenario would result in patent infringement claims being
shuttled between the state and federal court system for years,
while the sole reed of the patent holder's property rights is being
snapped.218 Accordingly, Congress could reasonably conclude
that a nationally uniform remedy for patent infringement was
"appropriate" to protect valuable patent rights, rather than a
piecemeal approach where Congress or the federal courts
exempted from the PRCA those states that might provide "due
process" through their state remedies.219
215 Id. at 157.
216 See Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 162 (1989)
("Since the Patent Act of 1800, Congress has lodged exclusive jurisdiction of actions
'arising under' the patent laws in the federal courts, thus allowing for the
development of a uniform body of law in resolving the constant tension between
private right and public access.").
217 According to Congress:
State courts are ill-equipped to deal with patent law. They have no
experience or jurisprudence to guide them. While, as a practical matter
they may look to the decisions of the Federal Circuit, they are not bound to
do so. It is problematical how conflicts between state applications of patent
law and that of the Federal Circuit could be resolved.
Patent Remedy Clarification Act, supra note 190, at 58 (statement of William S.
Thompson, President of the American Intellectual Property Law Association).
218 The right to exclude others in the United States from making, using, or
selling the patented invention is the sole right conveyed by a patent. See supra
notes 4-6 and accompanying text. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has defined the
right to exclude others from property as one of "the most essential sticks in the
bundle of [property] rights." Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 383-84 (1994).
219 Cf. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 133-34 (1970) (upholding nationwide
extension of the literacy test ban as a valid exercise of section five of the Fourteenth
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The Florida Prepaid Court stressed that the primary motive
behind Congress's enactment of the PRCA was to enforce
uniform remedies for patent infringement, which state remedies
might not provide, and to promote uniformity in the application
of the patent laws.220 It is undisputed that the need for
uniformity is implicated in the Patent Clause of the United
States Constitution. Uniformity in the application of the patent
laws, however, directly affects patent holders' property rights to
exclude others from using, selling, or manufacturing the
patented item, and the public right to use technology freely.221
In addition, unlike other forms of property, patents are granted
by the federal government and therefore are "national"
property.222 Accordingly, it is anomalous to suggest that a
patent holder's rights should vary from state to state. To ensure
the value and efficacy of patent property rights, those rights
must be valued equally in Florida as they are in New Jersey.
Moreover, the lack of a uniform tribunal system might result in
a scenario where vastly different judgments are imposed against
a state entity versus a private entity both alleged to be
infringing the same patent. Such results would lead to serious
uncertainty in the value of a patent. Thus, the mandate in
Article I for uniformity in the application of the patent laws is
implicated in the PRCA only to the extent that it creates and
defines the rights of a patent holder.223 And what is really
Amendment because Congress reasonably concluded that a national solution was
necessary). "Whether to engage in a more particularized inquiry... was a choice for
Congress to make." Id. at 216 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
220 See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank,
527 U.S. 627, 644 (1999) (stating that the primary point being made was not that
state remedies were constitutionally inadequate, but rather, that they might
undermine the patent laws' uniformity). The Court concluded that such concerns
belonged to the Patent Clause of Article I, but following Seminole Tribe, Congress
could not abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity to further such a concern. See
id. at 648.
221 The Supreme Court has stated:
Given the inherently ephemeral nature of property in ideas, and the great
power such property has to cause harm to the competitive policies which
underlay the federal patent laws, the demarcation of broad zones of public
and private right is "the type of regulation that demands a uniform
national rule."
Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 162-63 (quoting Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S.
151, 179 (1978)).
222 See 35 U.S.C. § 8 (1994) (providing for the classification of patents by subject
matter).
223 In its appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the State of Florida argued that
20001
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol.74:875
implicated by the need for uniformity is due process. The Court,
therefore, overlooked the importance of uniformity as a defining
characteristic of the property rights of a patent holder and the
concomitant need to protect this aspect of patent property.
The Court was also troubled because the PRCA does not
distinguish between intentional infringement and unintentional
or negligent infringement.224 Relying on its decision in Daniels
v. Williams, 225 the Court criticized Congress for failing to confine
the reach of the PRCA to non-negligent infringement or
infringement authorized pursuant to state policy.226  The
rationale in Daniels was based on the need to avoid
"trivializ[ing] the Due Process Clause"227 by making it "'a font of
tort law to be superimposed upon whatever systems may already
be administered by the States.'"228 The fear in Daniels that a
flood of due process suits would result, however, does not seem
applicable to suits alleging the deprivation of patent property by
a state entity. Unlike tort law, patent infringement does not fall
within the category of systems already "administered by the
States."229
confirming Congress's authority to enact appropriate legislation abrogating state
immunity would create an end-run around the Court's holding in Seminole Tribe,
proscribing Congress's authority to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity under
Article I. See Brief for Petitioner at 18, Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (No. 98-531). This parade of
horribles essentially contends that Congress will emasculate the Eleventh
Amendment by creating numerous new property rights pursuant to Article I, and
then protect those rights against unconstitutional deprivation by abrogating
sovereign immunity under the guise of section five "appropriate" legislation. See id.
at 19; see also Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 157 F.3d 282, 289 (5th Cir. 1998)
(stating that allowing Congress to enact legislation pursuant to section five
protecting intellectual property rights would amount to an "end-run around
Seminole's holding"). The Florida Prepaid Court was somewhat vague in its
response to this argument, stating in a conclusory manner, that patents "have long
been considered a species of property" and, "[als such, they are surely included
within the 'property' of which no person may be deprived by a State without due
process of law." Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 642 (citations omitted). Analysis of this
"end-run" argument is beyond the scope of this Comment. In any event, it is difficult
to foresee a flood of property rights being created by Congress because Article I
authorizes Congress to promote only the progress of science (granting patents) and
useful arts (protecting copyrights). See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
224 See Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 645.
225 474 U.S. 327, 328-31 (1986).
226 See Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 645.
227 Daniels, 474 U.S. at 335.
228 Id. at 332 (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976)).
229 Id.
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Moreover, the Court has stated that Congress is entitled to
exercise its powers to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment in a measured manner, even if its legislation
extends beyond the substantive reach of the Amendment.
230
Congress heard specific testimony that "if current legal
immunity continues, states will begin to disregard, perhaps
carelessly, patent rights, and perhaps in time to knowingly
infringe patent rights."2 1 Therefore, Congress could reasonably
conclude that state liability for unintentional or negligent
infringement was necessary to minimize the risk of intentional
infringement.232
As a practical matter, infringement actions based on mere
negligence rarely arise.233 In general, patentees are required to
put the infringer on notice before they can collect damages.
234
Although on its face, the PRCA applies to negligent conduct as
well as intentional conduct, in application, a state entity will
almost always be alleged to have intentionally or knowingly
infringed a patent.2 5
230 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997) (stating that
"[pireventive measures prohibiting certain types of laws may be appropriate when
there is reason to believe that many of the laws affected by the congressional
enactment have a significant likelihood of being unconstitutional").
231 Patent Remedy Clarification Act, supra note 190, at 57 (prepared statement
ofWilliam S. Thompson).
232 Cf City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 173-78 (1980) (validating
the reach of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to bar voting changes with a retrogressive
effect but no discriminatory intent, because of the risk of unconstitutional
"purposeful discrimination"); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582,
586 & n.7, 587 (1983) (agreeing with the district court that although petitioners
failed to show discriminatory intent, they were entitled to relief under Title VII
because the tests employed by the respondent had a disparate impact upon
minorities); see also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S 424, 432 (1971) (stating that
under Title VII, "good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem
employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds'
for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability") (emphasis
added).
233 The patent statute provides:
In the event of failure so to mark [the patented item with notice of its
status as patented property], no damages shall be recovered by the
patentee in any action for infringement, except on proof that the infringer
was notified of the infringement and continued to infringe thereafter, in
which event damages may be recovered only for infringement occurring
after such notice.
35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (1994).
234 See Steven Pokotilow & Matthew Siegel, Cease and Desist Letters: The Legal
Pitfalls for Patentees, INTELL. PROP. STRATEGIST, Dec. 1997, at 1.
235 Indeed, CSB alleged that Florida Prepaid's infringement was willful and
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In sum, enactment of the PRCA was a valid exercise by
Congress of enforcing the procedural guarantees of the Due
Process Clause. The PRCA ensured that when a state was
alleged to have infringed a patent, it could not subsequently
assert the defense of sovereign immunity and thereby deprive a
patent owner of his or her property interests without due process
of law. Accordingly, by providing meaningful post-deprivation
remedies, the PRCA constituted "appropriate" legislation under
section five of the Fourteenth Amendment.
3. Taking of Property
In addition to prohibiting the states from depriving persons
of their property without due process of law, section one of the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the states from taking
property without just compensation. 236 Accordingly, pursuant to
section five, Congress was authorized to enact the PRCA as
"appropriate" legislation to enforce the Takings Clause against
the states. 237
A threshold issue is whether a state entity's infringement of
a patent constitutes a taking for purposes of the Takings Clause.
Typical "taking" cases involve tangible items such as land or
chattel. 238  Patents, however, are intangible property and
done with actual knowledge of CSB's patent. See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 653 (1999) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
236 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 383-84 (1984) (stating that the
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause is incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment,
relying on Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239
(1897)).
27 The Court found that neither the statute nor the congressional reports
supported the proposition that Congress had the Takings Clause in mind when it
enacted the PRCA. See Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 642 n.7. The Court concluded
that since Congress was so explicit about its authority to enforce the Due Process
clause, the Court was precluded from considering the Takings Clause as a basis to
uphold the constitutionality of the PRCA. See id. This simplistic dismissal of an
alternative basis upon which to uphold the PRCA runs contrary to the Court's
previously stated position that Congress need not specifically cite its source of power
when legislating pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. See EEOC v. Wyoming,
460 U.S. 226, 243 n.18 (1983); see also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 653
(1966) ("It is not for us to review the congressional resolution of these factors...
[rather] [i]t is enough that we be able to perceive a basis upon which the Congress
might resolve the conflict as it did.") (emphasis added).
238 Recent Supreme Court cases seem to indicate a willingness on the part of
the Court to find a taking in non-traditional areas. In Phillips v. Washington Legal
Foundation, 524 U.S. 156 (1998), the Court held that interest earned on client funds
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therefore, a governmental entity does not "take" a patent in the
same sense as when it condemns real property, takes an
easement over real property, or seizes personal property.239
Nonetheless, several Supreme Court decisions support the
proposition that the federal government's infringement of a
patent constitutes a "taking."240 Recent lower court decisions
have supported this proposition and have extended it to the
states.24
1
It is a fundamental axiom of property law that when
analyzing property, the focus is on the bundle of legal rights
held under Texas' Interest on Lawyers Trust Account Program and used to finance
legal services for low-income persons is the private property of the client for Takings
Clause purposes. See id. at 172. In Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 503-
38 (1998), four Justices concluded that a federal statute, which retroactively
required the plaintiff to fund benefits for retired workers who had spent the
majority of their careers with other employers, constituted a taking. A fifth Justice
concluded that the federal statute constituted a violation of substantive due process.
See id. at 539-50 (Kennedy, J., concurring part and dissenting in part). For a
discussion of substantive due process and how that doctrine relates to intellectual
property rights see infra Part III.D.4.
239 See Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 217-18 (1985) ("While one may
colloquially link infringement with some general notion of wrongful appropriation,
infringement plainly implicates a more complex set of property interests than does
run-of-the-mill theft, conversion, or fraud.").
240 See, e.g., United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 191
(1933) ("The government has no more power to appropriate a man's property
invested in a patent than it has to take his property invested in real estate.")
(citation omitted); William Cramp & Sons Ship & Engine Bldg. Co. v. International
Curtis Marine Turbine Co., 246 U.S. 28, 41-45 (1918) (holding that based on the
concept of condemnation, a federal statute required the federal government to
compensate a patentee for his invention); Crozier v. Fried. Krupp Aktiengesell-
schaft, 224 U.S. 290, 304-07 (1912) (reaching the same conclusion as the Court in
William Cramp); Hollister v. Benedict & Burnham Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 59, 67-68
(1885) (stating that had the government infringed a valid patent, its actions would
constitute a taking); James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 357-59 (1881) (reaching the
same conclusion as the Court in Hollister).
241 See, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 86 F.3d 1566, 1571-72 (Fed.
Cir. 1996) (stating that the federal government's unlicensed use of a patent
constituted a taking); Jacobs Wind Elec. Co. v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 919 F.2d
726, 728-29 & n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (afffiming dismissal of a patent infringement
claim against a state entity but stating that the plaintiff could assert a takings
claim against the state entity in state court); Chew v. California, 893 F.2d 331, 336
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (reaching the same conclusion as the court in Jacobs); Leesona
Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958, 964 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (stating that when the
government infringes a patent, it is deemed to have "taken" the patent under the
eminent domain theory); College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd., 948 F. Supp. 400,423-24 (D. N.J. 1996), affd, 148 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir.
1998), rev'd, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (noting that a state entity's use of a patented
invention effected a taking without just compensation).
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inherent in the property.242 The owner of a patent is granted the
right to exclude others from using the invention, and federal law
protects this exclusion. 243 This right to exclude others, therefore,
defines the property rights of a patent holder.244 In addition, the
Supreme Court has often emphasized the right to the exclusive
use of property as a vital element in its Takings Clause
calculus. 245  Therefore, patent property is perhaps the
quintessential Fourteenth Amendment property interest.246
Three factors have traditionally guided the Court's
regulatory takings analysis: "[tihe economic impact of the
regulation, its interference with reasonable investment backed
expectations, and the character of the governmental action."247
The owner of an infringed patent retains the right to prevent
others from making, using, or selling the underlying invention.
And by infringing a patent, the state entity does not itself
acquire any exclusive rights to the patent. Infringement,
however, significantly reduces the value of a patent because the
patent holder has lost a significant, if not the sole, economic
advantage-the right to exclude others from making, using, and
selling the patented property. In cases involving regulatory
takings, the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected claims
242 See Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 581 (1937) ("Indeed,
ownership itself.., is only a bundle of rights and privileges invested with a single
name.").
243 The Patent Act provides that anyone who "without authority makes, uses or
sells any patented invention, within the United States" has infringed the patent. 35
U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994).
24 See supra notes 4-19 and accompanying text.
245 See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1984) (stating that
public access to the petitioner's land would deprive him of the right to exclude
others, "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle rights," and therefore, would
constitute a taking) (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176, 179-
80 (1979) (holding the right to exclude others as a "fundamental element" of
Fourteenth Amendment property)).
2M6 See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002-04 (1984) (noting that
the "general perception of trade secrets as property is consonant with a notion of
'property' that extends beyond land and tangible goods and includes the products of
an individual's 'labour and invention' " and therefore, the "trade-secret property
right.., is protected by the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment") (quotations
omitted). But see United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78
(1945) (analyzing property rights only in terms of a person's relation to physical
things).
247 Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 523-24 (1998) (citation omitted);
see also Pennsylvania Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978) (announcing the same three factors cited in Eastern Enterprises).
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premised solely upon a reduction in the value of the property.248
These cases, however, are distinguishable. Unlike the holder of
a patent, an owner of land, chattel, or money does not possess a
justified expectation to the full use of his or her property.249 A
patent, however, grants its owner an exclusive right to share in
the profits attributable to the patent.250 Therefore, unlike the
typical takings cases, a patentee has a justified investment-
based expectation, protected by federal law, that the patentee
will reap the exclusion value of the patent.251 Accordingly, a
state entity's infringement of a patent significantly interferes
with a patentee's reasonable investment-based expectation and
therefore, constitutes a taking.
The character of the governmental action also supports the
finding of a legally cognizable taking. Infringement can be
viewed as an invasion of property, which is a per se taking
regardless of the level of injury to the patentee.252 Unlike in a
248 See, e.g., Concrete Pipe & Products, Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension
Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 645 (1993) ("[Olur cases have long established that mere
diminution in the value of property, however serious, is insufficient to demonstrate a
taking.") (emphasis added); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1015-16 (1992) (stating that a regulation qualifies as a taking only when it "denies
all economically beneficial or productive use of land") (emphasis added); First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987)
(stating that a city ordinance barring construction in a floodplain is only a taking if
all economic or beneficial use has been barred); Pennsylvania Central, 438 U.S. at
137 (concluding that since the owner of a landmark building was granted
transferable development rights, the economic impact on the owner fell short of
what would be required for a taking).
249 See Pennsylvania Central, 438 U.S. at 124-25.
250 Cf. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984). In Monsanto, the
Court stated that a company had a justified expectation of exclusivity in its trade
secret information and that the federal law requiring disclosure would deprive the
owner of most of the value of the trade secret. See id. at 1010-12. The Court,
therefore, held that the government was required to compensate the owner for the
reduction in value, even though the trade secret retained some value to the owner.
See id. Although there always remains some incidental value in the invention
underlying an infringed patent, the critical issue is the value of the patent itself See
id.
251 When a state infringes a patent, the patentee's ability to earn profits is
seriously reduced. When the state entity is a market competitor, the patentee's
exclusive economic rights are reduced even further. And when the state is the sole
purchaser of the patented item, infringement reduces the value of a patent to nil.
See id.
252 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436-37
(1982) (holding that the installation of television cables on petitioners' property
constituted a taking even though only a de minimis portion of the property was
used).
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regulatory takings case, where the government enacts a law of
general applicability, in physical invasion cases-and similarly
in infringement cases-the government has "singled out" the
owner of the property, or patent, to shoulder the entire burden of
the governmental action.253 Indeed, by infringing, the state has
singled out the patentee and has significantly interfered with the
patentee's right to exclude others from making, using, or selling
the patented property.254 Such governmental action constitutes
a taking, and requires that the patentee be compensated.
Another significant issue is raised by the proposition of
sustaining the PRCA as "appropriate" legislation to enforce the
Takings Clause. It is clear that the states are constitutionally
compelled to return just compensation when they take private
property for public use. As a threshold matter, however, it is
uncertain whether the states are constitutionally permitted,
under their eminent domain powers, to "take" a patent for public
use. Phrased differently, the issue is whether federal law
preempts the states from exercising their eminent domain power
over federally-granted patents.
Congress has provided for a statutory remedy obligating the
federal government to pay "reasonable and entire compensation"
for the manufacture or use of a patented invention or
copyrighted work without the owner's permission.255 It is clear,
therefore, that the federal government is authorized to condemn
a patent so long as the patentee is compensated.256
253 The purpose of the Takings Clause is "to bar Government from forcing some
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole." Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
254 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1984) (emphasizing the right
to exclude others, and finding a taking where the property owner was required to
convey a fifteen-foot strip of land to the city); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444
U.S. 164, 178-80 (1979) (stressing the right to exclude and finding a taking where
the petitioner was required to provide public access to its pond, which was a
navigable waterway).
255 See 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a)-(b) (1994). The Federal Circuit has stated that
section 1498(a) actions are ones in which "the patent owner is seeking to recover
just compensation for the Government's unauthorized taking and use of his
invention." Motorola, Inc. v. United States, 729 F.2d 765, 768 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(emphasis added).
256 See, e.g., McCreary v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 533, 536 n.1 (Fed. Cl. 1996)
(stating that in an action under section 1498, patent infringement by the United
States is an uncompensated taking of private property under the Fifth
Amendment); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 11, 28-29 (1994)
(reaching the same result as McCreary); see also Thomas F. Cotter, Do Federal Uses
of Intellectual Property Implicate the Fifth Amendment?, 50 FLA. L. REV. 529, 541-
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A patent is an exclusive franchise granted by the federal
government pursuant to federal law.257  Arguably, the
Supremacy Clause 258 preempts a state from exercising its power
of eminent domain over a patent.259 As with all instances of
preemption, a court should begin "with the assumption that the
historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by
[a] Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress."260 Thus, the central focus in determining whether
federal law and state regulation conflict to the degree that the
latter is preempted by federal legislation is the intent of
Congress. 261 Congress's intent to preempt state regulation may
be explicitly stated in the language of a statute. 262 Alternatively,
state law is implicitly preempted when it frustrates the purposes
and objectives of congressional legislation.263 The federal patent
laws do not explicitly declare that state regulation of patents is
preempted. James Madison, however, said that "[tihe utility of
[the Patent Clause] will scarcely be questioned.. . The States
cannot separately make effectual provision for either [copyrights
or patents], and most of them have anticipated the decision of
this point, by laws passed at the instance of Congress."264
Therefore, it has long been accepted that federal patent law,
44 (1998) (discussing whether the federal government's use of patented property
constitutes a taking).
2W7 See 60 AM. JUR. 2D Patents §§ 1-6 (1987) (discussing the inherent
characteristics of a patent).
2Z8 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme law of the
Land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the
[C]onstitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.").
259 Cf. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 240 (1824) (holding that under the
Supremacy Clause, a state could not impair a federal license to engage in coasting
trade).
260 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
261 See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (discussing the
first step in a Supremacy Clause analysis).
262 See id.
263 See Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995). In Myrick, the
Court stated that it will find implied preemption when state law "stands as an
absolute bar to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress." Id. at 287 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67
(1941)).
264 Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527
U.S. at 650 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 267
(James Madison) (H. Lodge ed., 1908)).
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
enacted pursuant to Article I of the U.S. Constitution,
thoroughly occupies the field of patent law "as to make
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the
States to supplement it."265
In addition, one of the principles of American intellectual
property law is a general aversion to compulsory licensing.266
One of the few instances when a patentee is required to grant a
license is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1498.267 If the states, however,
are permitted to exercise their eminent domain power over
patents, they are, in effect, being permitted to frustrate federal
law by taking a compulsory license where private individuals are
not permitted to do so. By subjecting the states to patent suits
in federal court, the very enactment of the PRCA itself can be
viewed as Congress's intent to preempt "takings" claims against
states and concomitantly, its express intent to preempt the
states' eminent domain power over patents.
A district court decision involving federal geothermal leases
on federally owned land illustrates an attractive comparison. In
Grace Geothermal Corp. v. Northern California Power Agency, 268
the plaintiff, a lessee under a United States geothermal
resources lease granted by the Department of the Interior,
sought to enjoin a state entity from filing a condemnation
proceeding against the plaintiff's interest in the federally-owned
265 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516 (citations omitted). See Bonito Boats Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 152 (1989) (stating that "our past decisions
have made clear that state regulation of intellectual property must yield to the
extent that it clashes with the balance struck by Congress in our patent laws");
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964) (holding that state
law protecting the plaintiffs invention was in conflict with federal patent law);
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964) (holding that state law may
not prohibit replication of an unpatented item because it would interfere with
federal patent laws); see also Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Access to the National
Information Infrastructure, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 51, 90 n.230 (1995) (discussing
condemnation and eminent domain regarding intellectual property, and suggesting
that the "copyright and patent statutes broadly preempt state law, and therefore
[the] exercise of eminent domain by state governments would interfere with
federally granted rights and presumably be preempted").
266 See Hybritech, Inc. v. Abbott Lab., 849 F.2d 1446, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(stating that the right to exclude others may not be compensated by mere payment
of monetary damages, which amounts to a compulsory license in the face of
continuing infringement).
267 See Motorola, Inc. v. United States, 729 F.2d 765, 768 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(stating that in a section 1498(a) action, the United States is in the position of a
"compulsory, nonexclusive licensee").
268 619 F. Supp. 964 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
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property.269 The state entity attempted to acquire the plaintiffs
interest in the federal lease.270 When a conflict arose between
the parties, the state entity threatened to condemn the lease
under its eminent domain powers.271 The district court granted
a preliminary injunction against the state entity and concluded
that the plaintiff was likely to prevail on the issue of whether the
defendant's exercise of its state power of eminent domain over
the federally-granted geothermal leases is preempted by the
Supremacy Clause.272 First, the court noted that the Geothermal
Steam Act does not authorize a state to condemn a lease by its
power of eminent domain.273 Next, the court noted that the
Secretary of the Interior had "established a comprehensive
regulatory scheme which is inconsistent with [the defendant's]
claimed right of condemnation."274 Furthermore, using a public
policy argument, the court observed that the primary purposes of
the Geothermal Steam Act of 1970 were to encourage private
investment and develop federal geothermal resources.27 5 The
court reasoned that the willingness of private enterprises to
acquire and develop federal geothermal leases would be
adversely affected by allowing a state entity to condemn such
lease interests.276
The Grace decision can be viewed as a template in
attempting to decide whether a state may condemn a patent.
First, nowhere in the Patent Act is a state granted the authority
to condemn a patent by its power of eminent domain. Next, the
patent laws establish a comprehensive regulatory scheme
inconsistent with a state's claimed right of condemnation.
Finally, the primary purpose underlying the Patent Act is to
269 See id. at 966-67.
270 See id. at 967.
271 See id.
272 See id. at 970. f. Transwestern Pipeline Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 492 F.2d
878, 883-84 (10th Cir. 1974) (holding that federal leases acquired under the Mineral
Leasing Act of 1920 were not subject to state condemnation).
273 See id. The Geothermal Steam Act of 1970 provides: "Rights to develop and
utilize geothermal steam and associated resources underlying lands owned by the
United States may be acquired solely in accordance with the provisions of this
chapter." 30 U.S.C. § 1022(b) (1994) (emphasis added).
274 See Grace, 619 F. Supp. at 970.
275 See id.
276 See id. at 971. The court further noted that the risk of possible state
condemnation would reduce bid amounts in future competitive bidding to acquire
such leases and would thus adversely affect federal revenue. See id.
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encourage individuals to produce significant inventions.277
Therefore, the willingness of individuals and enterprise to
develop new and useful inventions would be adversely affected
by permitting a state to condemn patents. Although the
Supreme Court has yet to rule on this issue, the arguments set
out above seem to suggest that the states may be preempted
from exercising their eminent domain power over patents.
Assuming, arguendo, that the infringement of a patent
constitutes a "taking," two observations can be made. First, if
the states are constitutionally permitted to "take" patent
property by infringement or otherwise under their eminent
domain power, Congress could reasonably decide that, in order to
provide just compensation to patentees whose patents are
condemned by the state, effective and uniform federal remedies
are necessary. 2vs Therefore, the PRCA constituted appropriate
legislation to enforce the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment by providing an experienced, unbiased forum where
a patentee is assured of receiving just compensation for his or
her property.
The constitutional remedy for a taking of private property is
just compensation, which generally means the "full monetary
equivalent of the property taken."279  The PRCA, however,
provided for injunctive relief, enhanced damages, and attorney
fees.280  Arguably, these remedy provisions were not an
appropriate response by Congress to ensure just compensation
for a "taking" of a patent.281 As a practical matter, however,
increased damages are unusual, even in patent suits against
277 See supra Part I.
278 The same arguments against state alternative actions and the need for
uniformity in regard to the Due Process Clause are equally in force here. In other
words, a federal court forum is required in order to provide "just" compensation as it
is required to provide "due" process. See supra notes 211-23.
279 Blanchette v. Connecticut Gen. Ins. Corp., 419 U.S. 102, 150 (1974) (quoting
United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16 (1970)).
280 See 35 U.S.C. § 296(b) (1994) ("Such remedies include damages, interest,
costs, and treble damages under section 284, attorney fees under section 285, and
the additional remedy for infringement of design patents under section 289.").
281 See United States v. Bodcaw Co., 440 U.S. 202, 203 (1979) (holding that
"attorneys' fees and expenses are not embraced within just compensation" to which
a property owner is entitled to in an inverse condemnation action) (citation
omitted). But see Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 518-25 (1998) (noting
that if a state refuses or is otherwise unable to pay just compensation, injunctive
relief may be appropriate).
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private entities.282 Likewise, courts do not routinely award
attorney fees against patent infringers.283 Therefore, the fact
that the PRCA authorized increased damages and attorney fees
against state infringers does not lead to the automatic conclusion
that the PRCA was not "appropriate" legislation to enforce the
substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. In any
event, a reviewing court could strike those sections of the PRCA
that provide for enhanced damages and attorney fees, while
upholding the remaining sections of the statute.
284
If, on the other hand, the states are not constitutionally
permitted to exercise their eminent domain power over patents,
then the PRCA could not be sustained under Congress's
authority to enforce the Takings Clause. Concluding that
Congress was authorized to enact the PRCA as "appropriate"
legislation to enforce the Takings Clause would improperly
legitimize the states' eminent domain power to condemn patents.
Of course, Congress may logically decide to strip the states of
their sovereign immunity when they exceed their power of
eminent domain. The remedy provided in such instances,
however, need not and should not be limited to "just
compensation," but rather, as the PRCA provided, to subject the
states and their instrumentalities to the provisions of the patent
laws "in the same manner and to the same extent as any non-
governmental entity. 285  Moreover, concluding that the states
are preempted from condemning patents would support this
282 See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text. Enhanced damages are
awarded only in cases of willful infringement and courts retain discretion to deny
such relief even in such cases. See SRI Intl, Inc. v. Advanced Tech. Labs. Inc., 127
F.3d 1462, 1464-65 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (stating that because enhanced damages are
punitive, "willful infringement" must be established). The legislative record of the
PRCA also notes that "[t]he standard for receiving treble damages in a patent suit is
very difficult to attain." S. REP. No. 102-280, at 10, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3087, 3096.
W83 See supra note 19 and accompanying text. Even in "exceptional cases,"
courts generally retain discretion to deny a patentee's request for attorney fees. See
B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Lab., 124 F.3d 1419, 1429 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (stating
that the party moving for attorney fees has the burden of proving the case
"exceptional" by clear and convincing evidence).
284 A court may sever unconstitutional provisions from an otherwise
constitutional statute if it concludes that Congress would have preferred for the
other portions to remain in effect rather than have the entire statute struck down.
See Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 506-07 n.15 (1985).
285 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(h) (1994). Limiting the remedy to "just compensation"
would, in effect, impermissibly authorize the states to condemn patents on the
condition that they pay "just compensation" to the aggrieved patentee.
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Comment's procedural due process theory.286 If the states may
not exercise their eminent domain power to condemn patents,
any alternative state remedy for patent infringement in the
guise of a "taking" proceeding would be unconstitutional.
Accordingly, Congress could reasonably ignore unconstitutional
alternative state remedies for patent infringement when it
enacted the PRCA as "appropriate" legislation to enforce the Due
Process Clause.
4. Substantive Due Process
Traditionally, substantive due process 287 bars government
action depriving persons of life, liberty, or property that "shocks
the conscience," regardless of whether the state provides "due
process" or "just compensation."2 8 Following the conclusion of
the notorious Lochner era,28 9 the United States Supreme Court
has limited its substantive due process jurisprudence to areas
concerning fundamental rights such as privacy,290  which
encompasses marriage, procreation, and family.291 Traditionally,
when the Supreme Court has extended substantive due process
protection, it has inquired whether the purported rights at issue
286 See supra Part III.D.2.
287 Although the Supreme Court only considered procedural due process
concerns, one is not precluded from raising other Fourteenth Amendment bases of
upholding the PRCA. See supra note 237. Like procedural due process, the principle
of substantive due process is derived from the text of section one of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
288 See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846-47 (1998).
Substantive due process "bars certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions
'regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.'" Zinermon v.
Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990) (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331
(1986)).
289 During the era of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), the Supreme
Court used substantive due process grounds to invalidate legislation aimed at
promoting social goals. For example, the Court in Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312
(1921), held that a state's failure to protect a person's business by refusing to enjoin
employees from going on strike constituted a substantive due process violation. See
id. at 327-30. The Court analogized the plaintiffs business to a "fundamental"
property right. See id. at 329.
290 Privacy rights are those "fundamental liberties that are 'implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty.'" Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (quoting
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)).
291 See Harrah Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Martin, 440 U.S. 194 (1979). In Martin, the
Court held that a school board's refusal to renew a teacher's contract did not rise to
the level of a substantive due process violation because the traditional substantive
due process interests in "basic matters of procreation, marriage, and family life"
were not implicated. Id. at 198.
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are "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."292 In
Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City,293 the Court stated
that "[tihe patent monopoly was not designed to secure to the
inventor his natural right in his discoveries. Rather, it was a
reward, an inducement, to bring forth new knowledge." 294 Given
the Court's announcement in Graham, it is difficult to argue that
patent rights are "deeply rooted in the Nation's history and
tradition or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. "295
Therefore, it is unlikely that substantive due process extends to
patent rights.
A recent Supreme Court case, however, may indicate a
possible resurrection of substantive due process protection for
economic property interests in some circumstances. In Eastern
Enterprises v. Apfel, 296 a federal statute required the petitioner
to fund benefits for retired miners who had spent much of their
careers working for other employers. Four justices held that the
statute violated the Takings Clause.297  Justice Kennedy,
however, concluded that the Takings Clause was not implicated,
but rather, because of its retroactive effect, the statute violated
the petitioner's right to substantive due process. 298 The four
dissenting Justices agreed with Justice Kennedy that the proper
inquiry was whether the federal statute was "fundamentally
unfair or unjust" and if so, then the statute "deprive[d the
petitioner] of property, without due process of law."299 Eastern
Enterprises might support a future Court's conclusion that given
the substantial economic value of a patent, and the invidious
nature of patent infringement, patents should receive
substantive due process protection. The fractured nature of the
Eastern Enterprises decision, however, casts doubt on whether
the Supreme Court will resurrect substantive due process
292 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (invalidating, on
substantive due process grounds, a city ordinance which criminalized certain family
members' act of living together).
293 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
29w Id. at 9. The Court noted that Thomas Jefferson, widely regarded as the
father of American patent law, and the American society of his time-and probably
today-had an "instinctive aversion to monopolies." Id. at 7.
295 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194.
ms 524 U.S. 498 (1998).
297 See id. at 503-38 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
298 See id. at 539-50 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
299 Id. at 558 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The dissent concluded, however, that the
statute was not fundamentally unfair or unjust. See id. at 558-67.
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jurisprudence in the area of intellectual property and economic
rights.3 00
Under the various theories enumerated above, Congress's
conclusion that the PRCA constituted "appropriate" legislation to
enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment is entitled
to "much deference."301 Aside from invoking the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause in general, the legislative
history of the PRCA does not explicitly implicate specific
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. The record is
sufficiently broad,30 2 however, for a Court, which grants
"deference" to Congress, to read specific provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment into the legislative record.
Moreover, the holding in City of Boerne does not dictate the
Supreme Court's Florida Prepaid holding.30 3 The PRCA was
enacted to remedy and deter constitutional violations. 30 4 Unlike
the RFRA, the PRCA did not create new constitutional rights nor
did it define or alter existing rights.30 5  Instead, Congress,
through the PRCA, appropriately sought to correct or prevent
constitutional violations. In addition, in City of Boerne, the
RFRA's sweeping coverage intruded into every level of
government and prohibited countless official actions that might
have incidentally affected religious practices.30 6 In contrast, the
300 See College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
527 U.S. 666, 672 (1999) (declining to hold that a right to be free from a business
competitor's false advertising about its own products, or any other generalized right
to be secure in one's business interests, qualified as a property right protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
301 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (citation omitted).
302 The legislative record proclaims that the PRCA is an "acceptable method of
enforcing the provisions of the [F]ourteenth [Almendment... [T]he Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits a State from depriving a person of property without due
process of law [and] ... [Tihe Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress the authority
to enforce this right." S. REP. No. 102-280, at 8, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3087, 3094 (emphasis added). The general reference to due process in the legislative
record may encompass procedural due process, substantive due process, and
takings.
303 See supra notes 69-78 and accompanying text (explaining the City of Boerne
decision).
304 See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank,
527 U.S. 627, 661 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting). ("The Patent Remedy Act [ was
passed to prevent future violations of due process .. ").
305 Congress's power under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment has been
delimited as "corrective or preventive, not definitional." City of Boerne, 521 U.S.
at 525.
306 See id. at 515-16.
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PRCA had its effect only when a state infringes a patent. As the
dissent in Florida Prepaid keenly observed, if infringement by
state actors is indeed rare, then the PRCA would operate only in
those rare cases. If such infringements are or become common,
then the PRCA would "likewise expand in precise harmony with
the growth of the problem that Congress anticipated and sought
to prevent."30 7 Thus, the issues that were of primary concern for
the Court in City of Boerne were absent in Florida Prepaid.
Accordingly, Congress's enactment of the PRCA achieved the
requisite congruence between the means adopted-making state
entities amenable to suit for patent infringement in federal
court-and the ends to be achieved, i.e., enforcement of the
substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.
5. Constructive Waiver
In addition to the contention that the passage of the PRCA
was a valid exercise of congressional authority, it is submitted
that the doctrine of constructive waiver is especially applicable
in areas such as patent law, where the states have not
traditionally participated and have granted complete legislative
authority to Congress. In Florida Prepaid, the Court summarily
dismissed CSB's contention that Florida Prepaid impliedly
waived its immunity to suit in federal court.308
The constructive waiver doctrine is premised on the logical
principle that a state entity may engage in federally regulated
activities that are traditionally carried on by private
enterprises. 309 When a state chooses to engage in such activities,
however, it may be burdened with the same federal regulations
and remedies imposed on private market participants.310
307 Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 663 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
308 See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank,
527 U.S. 627, 635 (1999). The Court observed that its decision in Parden v.
Terminal Railway, 377 U.S. 184 (1964), announcing the doctrine of constructive
waiver, was overruled in the companion decision of College Savings Bank v. Florida
Postsecondary Education Expense Board, 527 U.S. 666 (1999). See Florida Prepaid,
527 U.S. at 635. It is submitted, however, that the Supreme Court erroneously
overruled the Parden constructive waiver doctrine.
309 See generally Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
310 See id. at 196 ("[Wjhen a State leaves the sphere that is exclusively its own
and enters into activities subject to congressional regulation, it subjects itself to that
regulation as fully as if it were a private person or corporation.") (citation omitted).
Cf. United States v. California, 507 U.S. 746, 757-58 (1993) (observing that the
federal government's rights and responsibilities may differ when it acts as a
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Concededly, it might be cumbersome to distinguish between
traditional and non-traditional state functions that lead to
infringement of a patent.311 Therefore, the constructive waiver
doctrine may be deemed more appropriate in cases when a
private individual seeks a judicial declaration that a patent,
owned by a state entity, is invalid.312  A state entity's
participation in the federal patent system by obtaining a patent,
as opposed to its engagement in an activity that allegedly
infringes a patent, is perhaps more suitable to a constructive
waiver theory. Under the Parden doctrine, a state, or its
instrumentality, which has decided to obtain patents and thus
participate in an area under exclusive federal law, should not
have the unfair advantage of asserting an immunity defense in a
declaratory relief action.313 As the Federal Circuit in Genentech
contractor similar to a private enterprise, rather than in its sovereign capacity).
311 See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)
(stating that an attempt to draw boundaries between traditional and non-
traditional state functions is unworkable and inconsistent with established
principles of federalism).
312 See supra note 15 (discussing declaratory judgment actions in the context of
patent disputes).
313 See Genentech Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 998 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1993). In
Genentech, the plaintiff, fearing an infringement suit, filed a declaratory relief
action against the University of California and Eli Lilly, seeking to invalidate the
University's patent involving the use of recombinant DNA technology for the
production of human growth hormone. See id. at 935. The University claimed
Eleventh Amendment immunity and sought to dismiss the suit. Reversing the
decision of the district court, the Federal Circuit held that the University was not
immune. See id. at 935-36. The Federal Circuit decided that section 296 of the
PRCA abrogated state immunity from declaratory relief actions, as well as
infringement suits. See id. at 944. The court also concluded that the controversy
arose when the University accused Genentech of patent infringement and therefore,
the University could not claim Eleventh Amendment immunity to Genentech's
response to that accusation. See id. On remand, the district court held that the
Fourteenth Amendment limited Congress's powers in this case because Genentech
owned no patent and therefore, had no protectable property interest that it could
claim was deprived without due process. See Genentech, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ.
of Cal., 939 F. Supp. 639, 643 (S.D. Ind. 1996). It should be noted that the Federal
Circuit's decision was announced prior to the Supreme Court's landmark Seminole
Tribe decision. By the time the district court decided the case for the second time,
the Supreme Court decided Seminole Tribe. Therefore, unlike the Federal Circuit,
the district court was foreclosed from considering the Commerce Clause-and
presciently, the Patent Clause-as a valid source of congressional authority to
abrogate state sovereign immunity. On appeal from the second district court
decision, the Federal Circuit reversed again, basing its decision on constructive
waiver. See Genetech, Inc. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 143 F.3d 1446, 1454 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) The Supreme Court, however, vacated the Federal Circuit's decision and
directed the Court of Appeals to further consider the case in light of its decision in
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reasonably concluded, the University of California waived its
Eleventh Amendment immunity by obtaining a patent and
voluntarily creating a controversy that could only be resolved in
federal court.314  Therefore, constructive waiver is a valid
doctrine to be applied when a state uses sovereign immunity as a
defense to a declaratory relief action involving its patents. The
constructive waiver doctrine is especially necessary as the states
become increasingly involved in the market of patents.315
Nonetheless, in the context of the Florida Prepaid decision,
the constructive waiver doctrine might work as follows: Although
the states have historically assumed responsibility for the
operation of schools, the marketing and use of a specialized
investment program, the sort of which CSB had obtained a
patent, is neither a traditional nor a necessary means of
facilitating Florida's educational objectives. Thus, by the
infringing use of CSB's patented investment program, Florida
Prepaid constructively waived its Eleventh Amendment
immunity.
CONCLUSION
"Congress has vast power but not all power. When Congress
legislates in matters affecting the States, it may not treat these
sovereign entities as mere prefectures or corporations."316 These
words, written by Justice Kennedy, echo the current Court's
ideology regarding the delicate balance between Congress and
the states. As the Florida Prepaid decision demonstrates, the
Supreme Court currently intends to protect state sovereign
immunity in all but exceptional circumstances. Florida Prepaid
expands this doctrine into the realm of patents and other
intellectual property, significantly limiting congressional ability
to proscribe remedies for patent owners against a state for
College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board,
527 U.S. 666 (1999), which overruled the Parden constructive waiver doctrine. See
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Genentech, 527 U.S. 1031 (1999).
314 See Genentech, 998 F.2d at 940, 946. The Federal Circuit concluded that the
University's actions in procuring the patent, licensing it, and granting Eli Lilly the
right to demand the University to sue Genentech were commercial activities not at
the core of the purposes for which the University was chartered. See id.
315 Indications show that the states are increasingly involved in the
procurement of patents. See supra notes 161, 191.
316 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 758 (1999).
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infringement and other intellectual property violations. 31 7
This Comment criticizes the Supreme Court's decision in
Florida Prepaid. Throughout the analysis, an attempt was made
to sustain Congress's legitimate authority to enact the PRCA as
appropriate legislation to enforce the substantive provisions of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Various theories upon which
Congress could enact the PRCA have been presented.318 It
should be noted that although the Court tightened the noose
around Congress's legislative authority, it stopped short of
declaring that Congress may not, under any circumstances,
abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity in order to protect
intellectual property rights. Therefore, this Comment might be
used as a template for a future congressional attempt to
abrogate the states' sovereign immunity in the area of patent
and intellectual property law.
First, Congress should conduct renewed hearings in an
attempt to create a legislative record that strongly supports the
need to remedy constitutional violations. Although, at this time,
the legislative record still might not demonstrate widespread
and persisting deprivations of constitutional rights, it would
undoubtedly demonstrate a greater problem than that which
confronted Congress back in 1990.319 As a direct consequence of
the Florida Prepaid decision, state universities' intellectual
property managers will become less fearful of infringement suits
and accordingly, state university researchers will liberally
investigate and experiment with patented technologies. 320
Therefore, the Florida Prepaid holding will undoubtedly have
317 Implicit in the Florida Prepaid decision is the unconstitutionality of the
Copyright Remedy Clarification Act, 17 U.S.C. § 511(a) (1994), which attempts to
abrogate state sovereign immunity in copyright infringement cases. Like patent
claims, claims involving copyright infringement are within the exclusive subject
matter jurisdiction of the federal courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), (c) (1994).
318 The substantive due process theory is a less certain, but compelling theory.
319 See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank,
527 U.S. 627, 656 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that since 1992, states, and
especially state universities, have been involved in many patent suits).
320 See Scott D. Stimpson & James S. McDonald, Universities Discover Patents;
Great Potential, but Managers Must Beware of Pitfalls, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 18, 2000, at
S6 (noting that universities are increasingly realizing that royalties from patents
expand their resources and that Florida Prepaid's immunity from infringement
suits could significantly fuel university research efforts). "The [Florida Prepaid]
decision[] will give major state research universities a leg up in their fight to corner




the effect of increasing the incidence of patent infringement by
state instrumentalities, and thereby, bolster the congressional
record of state violations. New congressional hearings would
also confirm Congress's recognition back in 1991, that as the
states become increasingly active in the commerce of intellectual
property, an increase in the number of patent suits involving
states and their instrumentalities will ensue.321 The legislative
record should also explicitly pronounce the provision(s) of the
Fourteenth Amendment that Congress is enforcing. Until
Congress enacts new legislation purporting to abrogate state
sovereign immunity, patent owners must remain satisfied with
the Supreme Court's dubious assurance that "[we are unwilling
to assume the States will refuse to honor the Constitution or
obey the binding laws of the United States." 22
Congressional reaction to Florida Prepaid may be gathering
momentum,323 and new legislation that would counteract the
Florida Prepaid decision is making its way through Congress.324
Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) has drafted a bill that would
prohibit a state from acquiring federal intellectual property
rights unless it waives sovereign immunity from suit for
infringement.325 Under the same bill, a state that asserts
321 See 137 CONG. REC. S.4046 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1991) (statement of Sen.
DeConcini).
322 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999).
32 Shortly after the Supreme Court's decision in Florida Prepaid, United
States Senator Arlen Specter, in a speech before the Senate, called the Supreme
Court's recent decisions a "usurpation of congressional authority." See Diverse
Reaction to Florida Prepaid, THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STRATEGIST, Sept. 1999,
at 7. Senator Specter continued, "[if a member of the Congress made a judgment,
by what authority does the Supreme Court superimpose its view that it wasn't a
considered opinion?" Id. Taking direct aim at Chief Justice Rehnquist, Senator
Specter added,
In essence, the Chief Justice is telling us we did a poor job developing our
record before passing the Patent Remedy Act. As we all know, however,
many of us support legislation for reasons that don't make it into the
written record. The record is an important, but imperfect, summary of our
views. This is why past Courts have been reluctant to dismiss
Congressional motives in this fashion.
Id.
324 See Dugie Standeford, Congress, PTO Debate State Immunity From
Intellectual Property Lawsuits, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 15, 2000
(discussing the Supreme Court's ruling in Florida Prepaid and the new legislation
put together by Sen. Patrick Leahy that will "level the intellectual playing field"
between states and individuals); Phillip Tomasso, Has the United States Supreme
Court Given a Leg Up and Above the Law, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Jan. 2000.
325 See Tomasso, supra note 324.
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sovereign immunity would be denied any right to receive
monetary relief in actions brought to enforce its intellectual
property rights for a five-year period preceding the breach of its
immunity waiver assurance.326 In directly addressing the issues
raised in the Florida Prepaid holding, the Leahy Bill would
allow states to defend against an infringement action by showing
that there was no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 327 In
addition to the Leahy Bill, the United States Patent and
Trademark Office plans to form a blue-ribbon panel, comprised
of constitutional law scholars and participants from the public
and private sectors, to address the issues and concerns raised by
the Florida Prepaid decision.328 The Patent and Trademark
Office attorney-adviser has stated that "most people agree that
as states participate in the intellectual property system, it's only
fair they be subject to the intellectual property laws
themselves."329
The expansive view of sovereign immunity that the Court
has adopted in its decisions from Seminole Tribe to Florida
Prepaid330 adds uncertainty in other important areas of federal
law such as copyright,331 antitrust, bankruptcy,3 2 environmental
326 See Standeford, supra note 324.
327 See Ritchenya A. Shepherd, Getting Around IP Immunity, NAT't L.J., Feb.
28, 2000.
328 See id.; see also Standeford, supra note 324.
329 See Shepherd, supra note 328.
330 See, e.g., Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav.
Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (stating that Congress may not abrogate Eleventh
Amendment immunity under any of its Article I powers, and narrowing both
Congress's enforcement powers under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment
and concomitantly, Congress's authority to abrogate Eleventh Amendment
immunity under section five) (emphasis added); College Sav. Bank v. Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 672 (1999) (expressly
overruling the Parden doctrine of constructive waiver); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706 (1999) (extending sovereign immunity to suits brought by individuals in state
court to enforce federal rights); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996)
(holding that Congress may not abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity pursuant
to the Commerce Clause of Article I of the U.S. Constitution).
331 See, e.g., Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 204 F.3d 601 (5th Cir. 2000)
(adopting the Supreme Court's analysis in Florida Prepaid and holding a state
university immune from suit for copyright infringement because Congress did not
properly exercise its authority under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment in
enacting the Copyright Remedy Clarification Act, 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1994),
purporting to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity); Rodriguez v. Texas
Comm'n, 199 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2000) (same).
332 See, e.g., In re Mitchell, 209 F.3d 1111, 1121 (9th Cir. 2000) (analyzing the
Florida Prepaid decision and holding that "Congress did not act within the scope of
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protection,333 and civil rights.334 As the dissent in Florida
Prepaid aptly observed, "Congress'[s] 'wide latitude' in
determining remedial or preventive measures, has suddenly
become very narrow indeed."335 In sum, it is accepted that the
states must be accorded a degree of immunity from lawsuits.
Furthermore, a delicate balance between congressional power
and states' rights must be maintained under our constitutional
system. That balance, however, should not result in the states
being granted virtual absolute immunity, thereby fettering
Congress's constitutional obligation to enforce critical areas of
substantive law.
its abrogation power in enacting... [11 U.S.C. § 106(a), purporting to abrogate
Eleventh Amendment immunity], pursuant to the Bankruptcy Clause of Article I or
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment"); In re Straight, 248 B.R. 403 (10th Cir.
2000) (citing Florida Prepaid and dismissing an adverse action in bankruptcy
against the State of Wyoming because section 106(a) represented an invalid
congressional attempt to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity pursuant to the
Bankruptcy Clause of Article I or section five of the Fourteenth Amendment);
Kenneth N. Kee et al., State Defiance of Bankruptcy Law, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1527
(1999) (discussing the Fourteenth Amendment as a means of sustaining Congress's
attempt to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity in Bankruptcy proceedings).
333 See, e.g., David Milton Whalin, John C. Calhoun Becomes the Tenth Justice:
State Sovereignty, Judicial Review, and Environmental Law after June 23, 1999, 27
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 193 (2000) (discussing the implications of the Florida
Prepaid holding for environmental law).
334 In the Term following Florida Prepaid, the Court, in Kimel v. Florida Board
of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000), held that Congress exceeded its authority under
section five of the Fourteenth Amendment in abrogating the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. See Erickson
v. Board of Governors of State Colleges and Universities, 207 F.3d 945 (7th Cir.
2000) (adopting the Florida Prepaid rationale and holding the State of Illinois
immune from a private suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)
because Congress overstepped its Fourteenth Amendment authority in creating a
private right of action against the states in the ADA); Laro v. New Hampshire, CIV.
No. 98-547-M, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4702, at *1 (D. N.H. Mar. 29, 2000) (citing the
Florida Prepaid decision and dismissing a state employee's suit under the Family
and Medical Leave Act of 1993 because Congress exceeded its authority under the
Fourteenth Amendment and did not validly abrogate Eleventh Amendmentimmunity). The upcoming Supreme Court Terms will undoubtedly resume the
federalism conflict and promise to be just as controversial as the last few.
335 Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527
U.S. 627, 661 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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